Delcy Rodríguez’s silent dismantling of a subsidized food program, the CLAP (Comités Locales de Abastecimiento y Producción), shutters a scheme that epitomized the intersection of organized crime and the Venezuelan state.
The CLAP program was established in 2016 under President Nicolás Maduro during a severe economic crisis and period of food scarcity. Over the following decade, boxes of basic goods such as beans, pasta, and oil were distributed throughout the country. According to local media and both CLAP recipients and providers interviewed by InSight Crime, the boxes began arriving with increasing delays in August of 2025, until stopping altogether by early 2026.
SEE ALSO: How Criminals Take Advantage of Venezuela’s Food Aid System
While the government has yet to issue any formal notice about the program’s end, the Rodríguez administration has already started to implement new food assistance initiatives, such as grocery stores selling at discounted prices.
The apparent discontinuation of the food subsidy program marks the end of an era in which hunger was exploited and instrumentalized by both corruption networks within the state and allied and hybrid criminal groups that strengthened their power through the food boxes they obtained.
CLAP and the Hybrid Criminal State
While CLAP provided food to an impoverished populace, it also became both a criminal rent and a tool for social control, making it an important component of the criminal-hybrid state model developed under the Maduro administration.
The CLAP program was used by Chavista officials and politically connected businessmen for both illicit self-enrichment and complex money laundering schemes. One of the most emblematic of these figures is Alex Saab, a Colombian businessman alleged to be a frontman for Maduro, who has been charged in the United States with money laundering related to the CLAP program.
Under Saab and his business partner, Alvaro Enrique Pulido Vargas, the CLAP program purchased food and assembled packages in foreign countries, such as Mexico, before importing the finished boxes to Venezuela, according to the US Department of the Treasury. Venezuelan state-owned companies allegedly bought the boxes at hyperinflated prices, to the benefit of Saab, Pulido, and others involved. The funds used to purchase these boxes were also allegedly used to carry out convoluted bribery and kickback schemes throughout the country. The food itself was often inedible and frequently found to contain different ingredients than listed, according to a series of investigations by investigative outlet Armando.info.
The Maduro regime also allowed CLAP boxes to be distributed by allied criminal groups, both for the benefit of the state and the criminal groups themselves.
The National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN), a guerrilla group active in Colombia and Venezuela, used the CLAP program as a political tool. In 2018, the Venezuelan non-governmental organization Fundación Redes reported that the ELN controlled distribution of CLAP boxes in municipalities bordering Colombia and stuck labels with pro-ELN messages on the boxes before delivering them.
Criminal gangs, such as Carlos Capa and Tren de Aragua, were also allowed to distribute the CLAP boxes to generate profit. According to Transparencia Venezuela, a Venezuelan NGO operating in exile, Tren de Aragua controlled at least 66 CLAP localities through its Somos al Barrio JK Foundation. Rather than distributing boxes at subsidized prices, the criminal groups would demand higher payments.
SEE ALSO: Hybrid Governance and the Criminal Fiefdoms of Tren de Aragua
Colectivos, pro-regime armed groups, used CLAP boxes for both criminal and political ends. These groups used the CLAP for pro-Chavista voter manipulation, purposefully positioning food distribution infrastructure at “puntos rojos”—stations for Venezuelans to renew their “Carnet de la Patria” cards used to access CLAP boxes—alongside polling stations during elections. In this way, the Maduro regime outsourced political coercion.
Although the boxes at one point were sources of both income and propaganda for these groups, their disappearance is unlikely to noticeably disrupt their operations. Many of the gangs that previously distributed the boxes have since been dismantled or severely weakened by the government. Additionally, the ELN’s diversified revenue streams, which include illegal gold mining, drug trafficking, and extortion, mean they aren’t reliant on income from the CLAP. The colectivos, which have traditionally been heavily reliant on ever-dwindling state resources, are most likely to be affected by the end of this program. The end of the CLAP may increase their growing reliance on extortion and other criminal economies to make up for the shortfall in income.