The criminal war in northeast Colombia has escalated into a new phase of violence, as intense fighting between two Colombian guerrilla groups erupted in the Catatumbo region, a key cocaine production hub and criminal hotspot along the Venezuelan border.
The National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN) launched a full-scale offensive against dissidents of the demobilized Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC), reigniting a territorial war in Catatumbo, Norte de Santander.
Reports from the ground describe clashes in the municipalities of Teorama, El Tarra, Convención, and Tibú, among others. At least 80 people have been killed, including seven demobilized FARC members, according to the Colombian Ombudsman’s Office. Some 11,000 residents have been displaced from their homes.
The Catatumbo region, comprising eleven municipalities in Norte de Santander, is a strategic area for Colombian guerrillas. With almost 44,000 hectares of coca crops — much of it concentrated in the municipality of Tibú — the region is an important cocaine trafficking route into neighboring Venezuela, a long-time sanctuary for Colombian rebels.
The region is home to several armed groups that vie for control over the lucrative drug trade and routes. Among them, the ELN’s Northeast War Front (Frente de Guerra Nororiental – FGNO) is one of the major criminal players operating on both sides of the border. Meanwhile, the 33rd Front is part of the General Staff of Blocks and Fronts (Estado Mayor de los Bloques y Frente — EMBF), a coalition of FARC dissident factions led by Alexander Díaz, alias “Calarcá Córdoba,” currently engaged in peace negotiations with the Colombian government.
A War Foretold
Tensions between the ELN and the 33rd Front have been growing since the two groups reached a de facto non-aggression stance in 2022, establishing boundaries for their areas of influence and control of criminal economies, like the sale of coca base.
In April 2023, human rights defenders, residents, and international cooperation officials told InSight Crime that this uneasy “peace” was fragile and could collapse at any second. The ELN and the 33rd Front enjoyed a respite from military operations during most of 2024, thanks to ceasefires negotiated with the government as part of the Total Peace policy that seeks to broker peace with the country’s main armed groups. But the ELN and the dissidents exploited them as cover to further entrench themselves in the communities under their control, according to residents who spoke to InSight Crime anonymously because they feared for their safety.
Such concerns were echoed by an alert from the Colombian Ombudsman’s Office from November 2024, which claimed the groups were increasingly restricting humanitarian aid; carrying out selective homicides, kidnappings, child recruitment; and distributing propaganda. The report also warned that tensions were about to reach their breaking point.
Then, on January 16, violence erupted.
“We regret to inform the community of Catatumbo that the ELN has decided to attack all our units,” Andrey Avendaño, commander of the 33rd Front, claimed in an audio message shared on social media. “They have killed civilians, unarmed people. They have tried to remove families, the relatives of the guerrillas, of our people—women, children, people who were completely defenseless.”
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The motive behind the attacks remains unclear, but the murder of a family who owned a funeral home in Tibú occurred just a day before the fighting erupted. Funeral home owners hold a delicate role in the Colombian conflict in Catatumbo, often tasked with retrieving and handling bodies in remote areas where government presence is minimal.
In a press release, the ELN’s Northeast War Front accused members of the 33rd Front of carrying out the family’s murder, claiming the attacks were retribution for their deaths and other territorial aggressions. However, a government intelligence report, cited by multiple Colombian media outlets and backed by InSight Crime’s sources on the ground, suggested the ELN was responsible for López’s murder. Allegedly, the mortician recovered bodies of 33rd Front combatants against the ELN’s orders not to do so.
The ELN Makes its Move
With the events of January 16 and subsequent escalation of violence, the ELN is making a move to increase its control over the border with Venezuela to solidify one of its strongest positions in the country.
Since the demobilization of the FARC in 2016, the ELN has steadily expanded and consolidated its power in Venezuela and in Colombia’s frontier departments of La Guajira, Arauca, Vichada, and Norte de Santander. In Catatumbo, the ELN had gained the upper hand on most competitors. It fought the Popular Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Popular – EPL) and the Gaitanist Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia – AGC) between 2018 and 2022. The ELN displaced the EPL from its strongholds, and though reports suggest the EPL has resurfaced, it lacks the capacity to challenge the ELN again. Meanwhile, the AGC’s attempts to expand its presence outside the Cúcuta Metropolitan Area has largely failed.
The only obstacle left for the ELN is the 33rd Front, which has a strong presence in Tibú, along the border with Venezuela. The ELN has accused the front of murdering civilians and warned the local community that confrontations were imminent.
“The Catatumbo region is well aware that we had warned that if the 33rd Front of the ex-Farc continued to threaten the lives of the population and failed to fulfill its commitments, there would be no other way out than armed confrontation,” according to a statement from the group.
In other communication, published days after the killings began, the ELN accused the 33rd Front and demobilized FARC members of working with the government, an accusation used before to justify violence against civilians.
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The recent surge in violence comes days after Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, a long-time ally of the ELN, set himself up for another 6 years in power after widely questioned elections. The offensive also takes place as the coca market in Catatumbo has become one of Colombia’s most lucrative. During 2023, the Colombian coca market reached a record high, with the potential to produce over 2 tons of cocaine every year. Catatumbo, as one of the country’s largest production areas, is a crucial area for the ELN, which has the trafficking infrastructure and the ability to move shipments into Venezuela.
“They have the strategy, the money, and the expertise to consolidate,” said a community member who spoke to InSight Crime anonymously due to security concerns.
A Nail in the Coffin for Colombia’s Total Peace
In response to the clashes, Colombian President Gustavo Petro announced the suspension of peace negotiations with the ELN, condemning the group’s attacks in Catatumbo as “war crimes” and accusing it of lacking any commitment to achieving peace.
The future of negotiations had already been in serious doubt after the ELN attacked a military base in Arauca in August 2024, prompting the government to suspend talks. Although delegations from the ELN and the government resumed discussions in November and agreed to meet again in February, the fighting in Catatumbo has likely ended the chances of any peace deal with the group.
“What we have seen is not an isolated incident, but a clear and deliberate decision to seize a region, showing no regard for the civilian population,” Colombia’s High Commissioner for Peace Otty Patiño said in a radio interview.
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And while the ELN is well positioned along the border with Venezuela, its other fronts face significant challenges, which may explain its push to show dominance. Consolidating in Catatumbo could be its only option to establish itself as a leading actor in a key area for illicit activities.
In the Pacific department of Chocó, the ELN’s Western War Front (Frente de Guerra Oriental — FGO) has been locked in conflict with the AGC since 2018. Meanwhile, in southern Bolívar and northeastern Antioquia, the ELN is also losing ground in its struggle for control against the AGC. In response to the setbacks, the group has formed a fragile alliance with ex-FARC fronts in this part of Colombia to defend itself against the AGC’s increasingly aggressive expansion.
However, this new wave of violence raises questions about the stability of the ELN’s alliances. While the violence in Catatumbo may not necessarily spill over into other regions, the ex-FARC factions allied with the ELN in southern Bolívar are part of the same broader group of dissidents as the 33rd Front in Catatumbo, led by Calarcá. As a result, the fighting in Catatumbo could potentially impact other regions where the ELN and ex-FARC factions are allies.
*Alicia Flórez contributed to the reporting for this article.