Mexico’s newly approved judicial reform will see over 1,600 federal judges chosen by popular vote, sparking concerns over the judiciary’s vulnerability to organized crime.
On November 5, Mexico’s Supreme Court dismissed a ruling that sought to limit the scope of the reform approved in September 2024. Instead, it approved the budget for the first electoral round scheduled for June 2025. The reform also proposes changing the current appointment model, based on professional exams, to a popular election system, which in turn lowers the requirements needed to hold judicial positions.
Critics argue the reform, passed by the legislature in early September, could harm human rights and destabilize the economy, with some experts warning that its implementation could plunge the country into a constitutional crisis.
In an interview with InSight Crime, Lisa Sánchez, executive director of Mexico United Against Crime (MUCD), outlined the risks the reform poses to judicial integrity and its potential to open doors to organized crime in the court system.
InSight Crime (IC): What impact could the reform have on organized crime once it’s implemented?
Lisa Sánchez (LS): The judicial reform does not truly address issues of corruption, nepotism, impunity, or austerity. It introduces numerous regulatory and technical changes that will have a negative impact on organized crime matters.
The judicial reform directly contradicts the principles underpinning Mexico’s adversarial criminal system, which mandates that once a case reaches the oral trial stage before a judge, that judge cannot be removed mid-trial. If a judge is removed mid-trial, the case must start over. In the federal courts—where this reform will be implemented—this could severely affect criminal cases involving organized crime, such as extraditions, disappearances, kidnappings, drug trafficking, corruption, and embezzlement.
We are also concerned about the weakening of civil courts. The reform permits Mexico’s four armed forces, including the National Guard, to participate in public security, with military courts assuming jurisdiction. This could make it even harder to penalize excessive use of force, as well as crimes and collusion with organized crime involving security forces. Additionally, the reform may lead to frequent case restarts, giving military courts more room to expand their jurisdiction.
Finally, removing the judicial career requirements will erode the technical capacity needed to handle cases, leading to a complete deprofessionalization of the judiciary.
IC: Do you think anonymous or “faceless” judges would be effective for certain organized crime cases?
LS: The use of faceless judges has been implemented in various contexts with mixed results. In Italy, it was relatively successful, but in Peru, it was disastrous.
This figure can enable arbitrariness and, worse, corruption, as it goes against the principle of direct citizen election by anonymizing the judge. Additionally, there are very few federal criminal judges, so it is easy to determine their identities, making this mechanism unlikely to work as a protective measure. We do not believe this figure would be beneficial for Mexico. It’s naive to think that organized crime—especially given its level of governmental collusion—would be unable to access the names of judges and continue to threaten them as they currently do. What will happen instead is that victims won’t be able to identify judges to determine if they should be disqualified due to conflicts of interest or other impediments.
IC: How might corruption in the judicial system evolve with this reform?
LS: The opportunities for corruption will increase, not only during campaigns but also in the process itself. For example, candidate lists are validated through a political process. The Legislative, Executive, and Judicial branches are responsible for nominating these candidates, meaning that nominations are not open but rather vetted by political actors who may have criminal interests. Citizens will only know who nominated a candidate and in which circuit they are running, but they will have no means of scrutinizing the elected individuals.
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IC: What measures does the reform include to prevent corruption in campaigns?
LS: None, as it merely states that judges can campaign and access media time without public funding. However, there are no regulations to prevent a judge from receiving money from a cartel or a businessperson. Therefore, if judges want to campaign, their only options are to use their own money or rely on irregular financial support from someone willing to fund their campaign.
IC: In terms of organized crime, what issues does Mexico face that this reform does not address?
LS: Addressing the issues within the prosecutor’s offices. We have very little data on the functioning of justice institutions, yet the data we do have is concerning. Nine out of ten cases go unreported, and of those reported, only 0.6% are investigated. Of the 0.6% investigated, only 10% reach resolution. This sends a severe message of impunity. INEGI’s Justice Census shows alarming statistics: it reveals that prosecutor’s offices not only fail to resolve their backlog of cases, but also accumulate 60,000 new cases each year.
*This interview has been edited for clarity and brevity.
Featured Image: Inauguration of the second session of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation and the Federal Judiciary Council. Credit: CUARTOSCURO