A recent rift within the Second Marquetalia underscores the inherent fragility of alliances among Colombia’s illegal groups and highlights the significant challenges the government faces when negotiating with organizations of diverse and fragmented origins.
The Border Command (Comandos de la Frontera – CDF) and the Pacific Guerrilla Coordinating Committee (Coordinadora Guerrillera del Pacífico – CGP), two of the most influential factions linked to the Second Marquetalia, announced their split from the group that formed in 2019 after the peace agreement between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC). After the peace treaty, some high-ranking members of the former FARC rearmed, claiming they were betrayed by the government.
“Peace, democratic changes, and the reconciliation of the people cannot revolve around one person or a few individuals,” the two groups said in a communiqué dated November 20. “We distance ourselves from the name Second Marquetalia, and, moving forward, will no longer use this acronym.”
The division within the Second Marquetalia became apparent on November 16 during a meeting between government representatives and the group in Colombia’s southern Putumayo department. Before the meeting, a letter allegedly written by the group’s leader, Luciano Marín, alias “Iván Márquez,” surfaced, asserting that the gathering had not been authorized by the leadership. As a result, he said, those attending the negotiations could not legitimately represent the Second Marquetalia.
SEE ALSO: From Total Peace to Partial Peace: Negotiations with Criminal Groups in Colombia Fragment
Since June, the Colombian government and the Second Marquetalia have engaged in dialogue as part of Total Peace (Paz Total), President Gustavo Petro’s initiative to conduct parallel negotiations with various illegal groups. However, the process has been fraught with tensions, primarily stemming from the government’s refusal to lift the arrest warrant against Márquez.
In their communiqué, the CDF and CGP announced their intention to continue the dialogue process but operate independently of the Second Marquetalia.
The CDF, a criminal group formed in 2017, comprises FARC dissidents and members of the Constru, an organization established after paramilitary groups demobilized in 2006. The group operates in southern Colombia, particularly in the departments of Putumayo, Caquetá, and Amazonas, and since 2021 has been allied with the Second Marquetalia.
Meanwhile, the CGP, made up of multiple factions that broke away from the FARC peace agreements, wields influence primarily in the department of Nariño, near the Ecuadorian border. These regions are critical to the narcotics trade, hosting extensive coca plantations, cocaine production facilities, and trafficking routes for both domestic and international markets.
InSight Crime Analysis
Following its internal fracture, the Second Marquetalia has lost key economic and military strongholds in Colombia, significantly weakening its operational capacity. This shift is likely to diminish Márquez’s negotiating power, potentially redirecting his influence and focus toward Venezuela.
The division within the Second Marquetalia appears to stem from a power struggle between Márquez and other prominent figures in negotiations with the government, such as José Vicente Lesmes, alias “Walter Mendoza,” a delegate at the negotiation table, and Andrés Rojas, alias “Araña,” commander of the CDF. However, the departure of these leaders does not necessarily mean a strengthening of Márquez’s authority.
“Iván Márquez’s leadership has an expiration date, and that expiration is time,” Laura Bonilla, deputy director of the Peace and Reconciliation Foundation, a think tank and research center on the armed conflict in Colombia, told InSight Crime. “His leadership today is not the same as it was within the FARC. Other mid-level commanders are beginning to grow and compete for that same leadership. While his leadership is the most symbolic, symbolism is no longer enough.,” she added.
SEE ALSO: Two Years Later, Petro’s Total Peace Seems to Bring More Conflict in Colombia
With the exit of these factions, the Second Marquetalia loses access to key territories for the narcotics trade and criminal revenues, estimated at $3 million, according to El Colombiano. This undermines Iván Márquez’s negotiating power in dialogues with the government.
The Second Marquetalia in Colombia maintains a presence concentrated in some municipalities across departments such as Valle del Cauca, Caquetá, Huila, Meta, Santander, Vichada, and Guainía.
The group’s primary strength, however, lies along the border between Colombia and Venezuela, particularly in the departments of Vichada and Guainía and the Venezuelan states of Amazonas and Bolívar. In these areas, the faction led by Géner García Molina, alias “Jhon 40,” controls strategic zones crucial for cocaine trafficking between the two countries and mineral exploitation.
With the departure of the CDF and CGP, the group’s strategic balance may tilt further toward Venezuela. Combined with changes in its leadership structure, this shift could significantly impact the leaders’ willingness to pursue continued negotiations with the Colombian government.
Featured Image: José Vicente Lesmes, alias “Walter Mendoza,” and Luciano Marín, alias “Iván Márquez,” at the inauguration of negotiations between the Colombian government and the Second Marquetalia in June 2024. Credit: El País.