Following the demobilization of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC) in 2016, dissident factions of the group that formed before and after the peace process continued operating in the group’s former strongholds inside Venezuela.
Several of these dissident fronts deepened the political and military networks established by former FARC guerrillas, which allowed them to regroup, evade capture by Colombian security forces, and continue fighting to control illicit economies like drug trafficking and illegal mining.
However, the favoritism their predecessors enjoyed has eroded and Venezuela became a final resting place for many top former FARC commanders. In addition to the expansion of their longtime rivals in the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN), this led many factions to abandon Venezuela all together or significantly reduce their presence in the country.
History
Venezuela was a strategic operating zone for the former FARC rebels during a large part of the armed conflict in Colombia, but the country’s importance grew exponentially with the arrival of Hugo Chávez to power in 1999. This also coincided with the most extreme offensive carried out against the rebel group by right-wing paramilitary groups and the government of Álvaro Uribe in Colombia (2002-2010), who gradually cornered the guerrillas around the border with Venezuela, where they found safe haven.
During the Chávez administration, the guerrillas were accused of colluding with the highest levels of the Venezuelan government and the armed forces, which allegedly provided them with logistical support and weapons. There is also evidence that the FARC trafficked drugs with a loose network of corrupt elements of the Venezuelan military and government known as the Cartel of the Suns. This eventually led to criminal charges against high-ranking members of the government and sanctions imposed by the US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).
The presence of FARC encampments in Venezuela led to a diplomatic rift between presidents Hugo Chávez and Álvaro Uribe. Colombian intelligence reports leaked in 2010 estimated that around 1,500 FARC rebels were active in 28 sites in the border states of Apura and Zulia. In the final years of Chávez’s presidency, however, relations with Colombia improved under then-President Juan Manuel Santos. This was key to laying the groundwork for the FARC’s demobilization later on.
Between 2012 and 2016, the Venezuelan government played an important role as one of five countries that facilitated peace talks between the FARC and the Colombian government. This ultimately ended with the rebel group’s demobilization in 2017. However, Venezuela also became a safe haven for dissident FARC fighters that refused to participate in the demobilization process. While initially disparate and unorganized, these dissident elements eventually regrouped and grew in size as the implementation of the peace agreement hit roadblocks in Colombia and the criminal opportunities presented to them in Venezuela.
This is how Venezuela became an important sanctuary for the dissident FARC factions to regroup and grow stronger. The state of Apure, for example, emerged as a sort of barracks for the Second Marquetalia, one of the main dissidents factions formed by some of the FARC’s main peace negotiators and historic commanders that abandoned the peace process in 2018. The Second Marquetalia eventually allied with the Acacio Medina Front, a faction that never joined the peace process and maintained control of important border corridors and mineral deposits in Venezuela’s southern Amazonas state.
The state of Apure was also an operational base for the 10th Front, a faction allied with the main branch of FARC dissidents known as the Central General Staff (Estado Mayor Central – EMC) that is controlled by Néstor Gregorio Vera Fernández, alias “Iván Mordisco.” However, the group’s presence in Venezuela has been impacted by its differences with state forces and its rivalry with the ELN.
At the start of 2021, the Venezuelan military launched a failed operation to remove the 10th Front from Apure due to several disagreements related to drug trafficking profits on the border. These military actions increased in 2022 when the ELN entered the conflict and severely weakened the 10th Front, ultimately displacing them from Venezuela.
The perception that Venezuela was a refugee for the FARC dissidents began to crumble at the beginning of the 2020s. Several former FARC leaders have been killed in Venezuela since that time, including Miguel Botache Santillana, alias “Gentil Duarte” – a top commander of one of the main dissident factions following the peace process – as well as Seuxis Pausias Hernández Solarte, alias “Jesús Santrich,” Hernán Darío Velásquez Saldarriaga, alias “El Paisa,” and Henry Castellanos Garzón, alias “Romaña,” all one-time commanders of the Second Marquetalia. These killings, as well as multiple assassination attempts against former FARC leader Luciano Marín Arango, alias “Iván Márquez,” reflect the instability that these dissident groups now face in Venezuela.
The final debilitating blow that the FARC dissidents suffered in Venezuela was the August 2025 murder of Manuel Sierra Sabogal, alias “Zarco Aldinever,” another Second Marquetalia commander that the ELN ambushed along the border. His killing solidified the rupture of a criminal dynamic that had until that time managed criminal profits and territorial control in the states of Amazonas and Apure.
Leadership
The different hits that the FARC dissidents have suffered both in Colombia and Venezuela have fragmented their leadership.
After losing several of their main commanders and resisting many attacks on the border, Iván Márquez continues to lead the Second Marquetalia. The historic links that Márquez maintained with former President Chávez and his political connections have been one of the reasons why he has managed to maintain a presence in Venezuela.
On the other hand, the Acacio Medina Front is operating under the command of Miguel Días Sanmartín, alias “Julián Chollo,” and Gener García Molina, alias “John 40,” both of whom have consolidated their presence in the southern state of Amazonas and control drug trafficking routes and illegal gold mining sites in the Yapacana National Park.
The 33rd Front is currently led by Carlos Eduardo García Téllez, alias “Andrey Avendaño.” This faction is part of the General Staff of Blocks and Front (Estado Mayor de Bloques y Frente – EMBF), one of Colombia’s main criminal actors.
Geography
The FARC dissidents have concentrated their presence primarily in the border region with Colombia, although there are reports suggesting that the Acacio Medina Front has also made inroads into Venezuela’s interior, primarily the southeast state of Bolívar.
The Second Marquetalia has established its main base of operations in Apure, from where its leaders have long maintained drug trafficking infrastructure and coordinated with other criminal cells in Colombia. However, the group has been severely weakened by the recent attacks and killings of its primary leaders, causing them to lose power and territorial control in the state.
The Acacio Medina front has conserved its control of strategic corridors along the Venezuela-Colombia border on the Orinoco River that divides the two countries. At the same time, it has focused its efforts on consolidating its control in the state of Amazonas, an area that has offered the dissident front a safe haven. In particular, the mining region that surrounds the Yapacana National Park in the municipality of San Fernando de Atabapo is considered to be the group’s main operating base.
The 33rd Front is located in the Catatumbo region in the Colombian department of Norte de Santander, one of the country’s drug trafficking epicenters. While it initially maintained a sporadic presence in Venezuela, in 2021 the group began establishing a permanent presence in Zulia, which is an important departure point for cocaine produced in Colombia.
Allies and Enemies
In Colombia, the various FARC dissident factions increasingly converged around two spheres of influence: the dissident network led by Iván Mordisco and the Second Marquetalia. After some attempts to unify these forces, the relationship between the two sides deteriorated, which became evident in Venezuela due to the rivalry between the Second Marquetalia and the Mordisco-allied 10th Front in Apure.
There is evidence to suggest that the Second Marquetalia has maintained connections with the government of former Venezuela President Nicolás Maduro, who publicly claimed that Iván Márquez and Jesús Santrich were “welcome” in his country after they abandoned the peace process in Colombia.
In contrast, the Venezuelan government called the 10th Front “terrorists” and directly attacked this dissident faction despite clear links with Venezuelan military units deployed to the region.
In addition, the rapid expansion of the ELN in Venezuela has created competition with certain dissident FARC factions over control of drug trafficking and contraband smuggling routes on the Colombia-Venezuela border. In December 2018, some reports suggested that the Second Marquetalia had agreed to a non-aggression pact with the ELN to coordinate illicit activity in this region. However, the clashes seen in August 2025 suggest that agreement broke down over a possible battle for control of key mining sites in the south of the country.
Prospects
The various FARC dissident factions present in Venezuela face increasingly divergent paths.
With the removal of Nicolás Maduro following a US military operation on January 3, 2026, the future of the FARC dissident factions operating in Venezuela entered a particularly uncertain phase of strategic reconfiguration. Without the political support that for years guaranteed them impunity for their criminal operations, as well as growing US pressure on the new transition to show security gains, the operational leeway previously given to the Second Marquetalia and its commanders will not be the same.
The continued presence of the Acacio Medina Front in Venezuela has also been called into question following growing tensions with the ELN. Multiple security operations in Amazonas state, coupled with reports of clashes and the increased threat of foreign military intervention, have significantly reduced its room to operate. This comes amid the need to renegotiate criminal agreements with a new government and other actors still defining their positions of power. This could ultimately push the group to withdraw its fighters to border areas or substantially reduce its presence in the country.
Factions that lack state support and have clashed with security forces in Apure and Zulia, such as the 33rd Front and the EMC, face an even tougher situation. In addition to the pressure created by military operations targeting them, these groups have also clashed with the ELN, which has sought to consolidate its territorial and economic control in these areas. This double pressure has forced several dissident factions to retreat, fragment, or abandon Venezuelan territory altogether, leaving them with an unstable or, in some cases, virtually nonexistent presence in the country.