In 2025, Colombia faced levels of violence not seen in years, driven by clashes among criminal groups that have strengthened their military power and territorial control in areas critical to illegal economies.
While critics blamed President Gustavo Petro’s Total Peace (Paz Total) policy for these dynamics, the story dates back nearly a decade to the signing of peace accords between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC).
This historical backdrop is essential to understanding how Colombia’s security dynamics may evolve in the coming years. Presidential elections are approaching in May 2026, and violence may become a vehicle for criminal groups to insert their agendas into the political arena. Meanwhile, the Colombian government is getting less support from the United States, a shift that has serious implications for the state’s ability to confront increasingly complex criminal threats.
A Violent Start
The start of 2025 brought one of the year’s major criminal confrontations, which was the breakdown of a non-aggression pact between the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN) and the 33rd Front of the General Staff of Blocks and Front (Estado Mayor de Bloques y Frente – EMBF), a splinter faction of the Central General Staff (Estado Mayor Central – EMC), a leftover from the FARC.
In the Catatumbo region of Norte de Santander, more than 64,700 people were displaced, over 12,900 were forcibly confined, and 117 were killed between January and April 2025, according to the Ombudsman’s Office. Catatumbo is the main enclave for coca cultivation in northern Colombia and a strategic corridor for armed groups operating along the Venezuelan border, where the country has become a refuge for Colombia’s major guerrilla organizations.
But Norte de Santander is only one of at least 10 hotspots of violence identified by the Ombudsman’s Office. Chocó, Nariño, Cauca, Valle del Cauca, Antioquia, Arauca, Meta, Putumayo, and Guaviare also saw territorial clashes in 2025 over corridors essential to criminal economies, including drug trafficking and illegal mining.
These clashes reflect a broader shift toward the territorialization of armed groups’ operations, said Laura Bonilla, deputy director of the Peace and Reconciliation Foundation (Fundación Paz y Reconciliación – PARES), a civil-society organization focused on Colombia’s conflict. Criminal groups are now focused on controlling territories crucial to illegal economies, rather than challenging the state for national power as they did in past decades.
SEE ALSO: Two Years On, Colombia’s ‘Total Peace’ Brings More Conflict
“What we have today is a set of armed groups deeply connected to organized crime, if not directly providing services to organized crime,” Bonilla told InSight Crime.
Colombia remains the world’s largest producer of cocaine, and the groups driving the violence are also the main engines of the drug trade. But cocaine is no longer their only business. Territorial control gives them access to multiple revenue streams, including illegal mining, contraband, extortion, kidnapping, migrant smuggling, and wood trafficking.
These illegal profits have fueled the military muscle of armed groups. Between December 2024 and July 2025, the number of combatants grew by 15%, according to the Threat Critical Capabilities Assessment report (Accam) produced by Colombia’s security forces. This coincides with the steady territorial expansion of criminal groups since at least 2018.
Total Peace, Petro’s flagship policy involving parallel negotiations with various illegal structures, contributed to this strengthening by creating conditions for bilateral ceasefires. But it is far from the only factor behind today’s criminal dynamics.
The Apex of Criminal Fragmentation
Colombia’s various peace initiatives have triggered shifts in the country’s criminal landscape, often producing fragmentation and realignment.
After the demobilization of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia – AUC) in 2006, at least 30 criminal groups emerged, seeking to fill the power vacuum. After violent turf wars, the Gaitanist Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia – AGC), also known as the Gaitanistas or the Gulf Clan, consolidated as the primary heirs to the AUC.
A decade later, the 2016 demobilization of the FARC marked another turning point. Until then, the FARC controlled around 70% of Colombia’s coca crops, and their departure from the criminal arena left substantial gaps in strategic territories along the cocaine supply chain.
Illegal groups such as the ELN and the Gaitanistas quickly expanded into former FARC areas. Meanwhile, dissident and rearmed FARC factions emerged seeking to retain influence in key areas, including the Venezuelan border, the department of Chocó near Panama, and Colombia’s southwestern region bordering Ecuador.
These waves of fragmentation altered how criminal groups operate. The factions that emerged after these demobilization processes have organizational structures and objectives markedly different from their predecessors.
“These organizations are increasingly less hierarchical, with weaker command-and-control structures and greater territorial autonomy,” said Andrés Cajiao, coordinator of the Peace and Conflict Negotiations Program at the Ideas for Peace Foundation (Fundación Ideas para la Paz – FIP). “It’s a conflict and a set of confrontations that are increasingly fragmented, making them harder to analyze and address.”
SEE ALSO: From Total to Partial Peace: Colombia’s Talks With Crime Groups Fragment
Negotiations with the government have opened up internal fractures in groups such as the EMC, Second Marquetalia (Segunda Marquetalia), and the ELN. These groups operate autonomously in specific territories and connect with other actors through alliances that can break at any moment. That intensifies the fight for territorial control.
“What’s coming is a high level of confrontation,” Bonilla said. “Whoever proves most capable in this cycle of violence survives and absorbs the others.”
A Peak in Violence at the Worst Possible Moment
In October 2025, the Trump administration added Petro — along with his wife, son, and Interior Minister Armando Benedetti — to the US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctions list, which includes individuals accused of ties to drug trafficking or organized crime. Trump also announced cuts to aid to Colombia, accusing Petro of links to drug trafficking without providing evidence.
A month earlier, in September, the US government partially decertified Colombia for its counternarcotics efforts, alleging Petro’s government had failed to control drug production and trafficking, as well as the criminal groups behind it.
These measures pose serious risks for Colombia’s capacity to fight organized crime at a time when its criminal actors are stronger than ever. The United States has been Colombia’s main counternarcotics and security partner for decades, supplying funding for training, equipment, logistical support, institutional strengthening, and intelligence exchanges.
SEE ALSO: US Pressures Colombia With Threat of Anti-Drug Aid Cuts
Although Petro’s government has made record cocaine seizures — 836.8 metric tons between January and October 2025 in Colombia — these achievements have been overshadowed by rising coca cultivation and cocaine production potential. While the latest official data have not been released, cocaine production potential reportedly exceeded 3,000 tons in 2024, according to Spain’s El País, citing an unpublished excerpt from the annual report of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).
Presidential Elections Under Criminal Pressure
Colombia is preparing to elect a new president in 2026. In November 2025, Néstor Gregorio Vera, alias “Iván Mordisco,” top commander of the EMC, announced in response to government bombings that the group would resort to political violence ahead of the 2026 elections to defend its interests.
“We wanted the 2026 electoral process to have the least possible disruptions,” Mordisco said in a statement. “But given the offensive by warmongering sectors, we have no choice but to defend our territories, their tranquility, and political paths free from warmongering and corruption.”
Eight departments face a high risk of political violence during the elections, including Norte de Santander, Arauca, Vichada, La Guajira, Chocó, Nariño, and Cauca. Criminal governance and territorial control in these regions directly undermine free political participation.
“A very complex security scenario is expected, not only because armed groups are stronger, but also because they increasingly have stakes in parliamentary and presidential elections,” Cajiao said.
This violence has already begun: Miguel Uribe Turbay, a right-wing presidential primary candidate, was shot and killed in August 2025 after while giving a campaign speech in June in a Bogotá park. Investigations continue, but prosecutors’ leading hypothesis points to the Second Marquetalia.
“With Total Peace, armed groups increasingly see the electoral outcome as central to their long-term projections,” Cajiao noted. “These groups have used negotiations for military and strategic advantage — and to secure political concessions.”
In this context, the 2026 elections will define far more than a change in leadership. At stake are the continuity or overhaul of the Total Peace approach and the future of Colombia’s counternarcotics policy.
Henry Shuldiner contributed reporting to this article.
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