Ecuador’s presidential candidates come from a wide ideological spectrum, but when it comes to organized crime, their campaigns – and their political survival thereafter – will depend on presenting themselves as hardliners.
On February 9, the country will vote in the first of what is widely expected to be a two-round election. The second round is set for April 13. Polling, and recent history, say the top two candidates who make the second round will be current President Daniel Noboa of the National Democratic Action Party (Acción Democrática Nacional – ADN) and Luisa González of Citizen Revolution (Revolución Ciudadana – RC), who was the runner-up from the 2023 special presidential election that Noboa won.
Neither they nor the other 14 presidential candidates have offered too much beyond platitudes typical of politicians: militarizing prisons, ports, and customs offices, among other government institutions; calling for harsher jail sentences for criminals of all types; claiming they will build more prisons (including one on the “high seas”); pushing for new laws that may make it easier to try minors as adults; and claiming they will be the ones who will finally reign in corruption.
How they will achieve these goals – and pay for them – are not topics they have discussed in detail in public. But it doesn’t seem to matter to the electorate, which, in the midst of an unprecedented security crisis, appears to have an increasing appetite for mano dura, or hard-line policies.
Window Dressing?
During his 13 months in the presidency, Noboa has demonstrated a version of mano dura. Authorities arrested over 60,000 suspected criminals in 2024, and the government interdicted 280 tons of illicit drugs, a 29% increase from 2023.
Throughout, Noboa has also shown a penchant for constructing a favorable, tough-on-crime narrative. Few examples made this clearer than in July 2024, when he went to Durán, a municipality along the Pacific coast beset by violence and organized crime that has come to exemplify the country’s descent.
SEE ALSO: Durán: A Window into Ecuador’s Organized Crime Explosion
Dressed in a flak jacket and donning an army helmet that dwarfed his head, Noboa admonished his rivals for not visiting the beleaguered municipality.
“No [other] politician has buckled up his pants and returned the peace to their citizens,” he told the sparse, mostly military, crowd assembled. “This is the new Ecuador, the one in which we risk our lives every day to recuperate the land we love.”
As he spoke, Noboa was flanked by two members of his security detail, who held what appeared to be shields above their heads to deflect would-be sniper fire. Surrounding him were members of his vaunted Security Bloc.
“We won’t be here just a day,” he declared. “We will be here as long as it takes to finish the mafias.”
The Security Bloc is Noboa’s tip of the spear. It is a joint unit of military and police. The president sends them to crime-ridden areas to calm the fighting. It has worked, but not for long. In Durán, for example, violence dropped following the regular deployment of the military and the police. But it later returned, and the municipality ended 2024 with a record 476 homicides.
Noboa’s administration has provided similar window-dressing for the crisis in the prisons, where the army took over security at some of the country’s most notorious penitentiaries and affected several raids in a vain attempt to dislodge the prison gangs from their headquarters. Noboa has also said he is going to build new prisons, but he has not addressed the deeper problems – chronic corruption, punitive policies, a vibrant criminal-prison economy – that led to the crisis in the prisons.
SEE ALSO: Behind Bars, Beyond Control: The Fall of Ecuador’s Prisons and the Rise of Its Mafias
Still, for many Ecuadorians, these displays of force seem to matter.
“For a municipality, a municipality, he has to bring all that, as if he is going to war. That means that, as a State, I do not have sufficient capacity with my normal government resources to fight that,” César Navas, a former security minister and now consultant, said about the president’s visit to Durán. “[But] it works. For the population at large, it works.”
The narrative appears to have put Noboa in the driver’s seat in this election. Most polls have given him a substantial advantage for the first round, and one recent poll showed he may win the necessary 50% needed to avoid a second round. He has also used this image to smooth over the rough edges of his security deployments.
But Katherine Herrera, a political scientist and specialist in security matters, says the administration is more concerned with marketing a security strategy than implementing one.
“It’s not as important for the Noboa government to have a security policy than to have events in which you see all the tools of the security forces,” she said. “And that is what is used as a political communication tool, that you see the presence, but not the structural solution.”
The Untouchables
Noboa has some weaknesses, one of which stems from a recent military operation. On December 8, 2024, around 8:30 p.m., an air force patrol tried to stop 11 kids as they were headed home after playing a soccer game in the south of Guayaquil. What happened next is still under investigation, but eyewitnesses, as well as video footage, showed that at least four of the kids – aged 11 to 15 – were captured by the patrol. The other seven ran away. On December 24, the day Ecuadorians celebrate Christmas, the authorities said they found four bodies. On New Year’s Eve, the Attorney General’s Office announced that the bodies found were of the four boys.
Throughout, the government’s communications strategy was slow and chaotic. The military vacillated between blaming “delinquent groups” and claiming it had “zero tolerance” for impunity. The defense minister told Congress he did not hear about the case until December 19. And President Noboa didn’t make his first statement about the case until December 22, stating that he too would accept, “Zero impunity, for whomever it is.”
The next day, in an interview that was transmitted via YouTube, the president repeated the claim, before adding, “I’ve suggested to a commission that the kids be considered national heroes.” But in the days that followed, he returned to his muted stance, and his team later claimed that the comment was “manipulated with fake audio.” On New Year’s Eve, the day the Attorney General’s Office said it had identified the bodies, Noboa made no official statement, and the president’s official account simply reposted a military statement on the case.
By the time of the first and only presidential debate on January 19, the other candidates were seeking to capitalize on what had become known as the Malvinas case, a reference to the neighborhood where the kids were from. During a back-and-forth with another candidate, the other candidate challenged Noboa to say the kids’ names. In what became the most memorable moment of a mostly forgettable debate, Noboa refused.
Debate watchers on social media pounced. The four first names of the victims began trending on X, and attacks of the president proliferated. The other candidates also tried to take advantage of the moment, most notably Luisa González. But she, too, flubbed while trying to recite the four names of the kids.
The exchanges were more telling, however, in another respect: Although they attacked Noboa, none of the candidates mentioned the armed forces or the military. Instead, they called for “justice” or referred to the deaths of the minors as a “state crime.” To be sure, far from vilifying the military, candidates have spent much of their time campaigning that the military should be used more, not less.
These calls come despite widespread allegations of abuses and increasing worry about corruption that pre-dated the Malvinas case. In May, Human Rights Watch issued a damning report, chronicling numerous instances of the military involved in torture, arbitrary arrests, and at least one extrajudicial killing. More recently, InSight Crime detailed numerous cases of torture, neglect, and other forms of abuse.
Still, none of this appears to matter, says Renato Rivera-Rhon, the director of the Ecuadorian Organized Crime Observatory (Observatorio Ecuatoriano de Crimen Organizado – OECO).
“The candidates are leaning towards discourse that centers on militarization and penal populism,” he explained.
Ecuador Election 2025: Candidates’ Security Stances
| Daniel Noboa | Luisa González | Other Candidates | |
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| Militarization | Flagship policies of Plan Fénix and the Security Block are largely militarized approaches. | Mano dura approach to crime; some institutional and community programs. | Nearly every candidate has promoted a more punitive approach. |
| Prisons Crisis | Emphasis on “retaking” the prisons with security forces and building new prisons. | Classify inmates by level of danger and abolish the prisons authority (SNAI). | Proposals range from increasing the military’s presence in the prisons, to installing work-based rehabilitation programs for incarcerated people; to the death penalty. |
| Human Rights | Respect for human rights is a “primary pillar” of society, though the government has taken a combative stance when faced with accusations of violations. | “Zero tolerance for excessive use of force, repression of legitimate protest, and state terrorism.” | Some have promoted life sentences for predatory crimes, while others have noted the importance of respecting human rights in the fight against criminal groups. |
| Child Recruitment | Supports children as young as 15 years old being tried as adults for major crimes but has also recognized poverty and social shortcomings as factors behind kids’ vulnerability. | Says children need to be supported by state investments into sports and culture but did not address whether she would try minors as adults. | Many have emphasized the need for enhanced opportunities for minors in education, sport, and culture. Others have pushed trying minors accused of major crimes as adults. |
| Illegal Mining | Claims illegal mining is connected with “narco terrorist groups” and international cooperation is key to combating it, while also leaning towards reopening the country’s mining registry. | Has promoted enhanced law enforcement presence in mining areas and improved technical and monitoring equipment for authorities. | Candidates have called for audits of mining concessions and complete closures of legal mines in order to combat illegal mining. |
| Corruption | Says corrupt actors are part of a two-pronged security crackdown that includes delinquents. New prisons are also a place for corrupt actors. | Promises technical committees to ensure judges give proper sentences to criminals and a purge of the ministries of the interior and government, as well as security forces. | Proposals included boosting security forces’ training and salary, life sentences for corrupt judges, and inviting independent corruption evaluators to the country. |
Noboa understands this as well. In addition to dispatching the military to the prisons, Noboa wrote them into a national referendum, which, after it passed by a significant margin in April, gave the military an unprecedented role in fighting drug trafficking and money laundering, as well as the ability to intervene in prison riots without the president having to declare a state of emergency.
“It’s an improvisation as they figure out public policy on the go in a context in which, ideologically speaking, they think that only the military can resolve the problems,” Rivera-Rhon said.
On January 28, a hearing on the Malvinas case was postponed until after the elections.
Two Ideologies, One Result
During the presidential debate on January 19, the moderators asked González how she planned to reform a corrupt judicial system without compromising its independence. Among the candidates, González has arguably proposed the most integral, holistic vision of security. The Citizen Revolution (RC), in previous iterations, is also the only party that has effectively sought to demobilize gang members via what was known as “pacification.”
But in this new context, there is no room for talk of social programs or negotiations with gang members. And during the debate, instead of answering the question, González rattled off her three-point, hard-line security strategy: “strong institutions…coordination…technology.”
The non-answer is part of a pattern that troubles analysts. Specifically, critics worry that González, and her party, the RC, may seek to subvert the independence of the other branches of government, using the security crisis as a pretext.
In large part, this is related to the presidential administration of González’s mentor, Rafael Correa, who wielded a strong hand across the government during his time in power from 2007 to 2017, dismissing security officials and instituting a centralized power structure to control the flow of information and resources. Corruption charges also dogged the RC and Correa himself, who is in exile in Belgium due to criminal charges against him in Ecuador for accepting bribes.
González may have another, deeper problem. The Ecuadorian electorate links Correa ideologically to the emergence of Chavismo in Venezuela and Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua. And since he still has significant influence in the party, he has become a divisive figure in the elections. Put simply, for many voters, Correa, more than González, is the RC candidate, and that spells: authoritarianism.
“It’s part of the Correísta model,” Rivera-Rhon said, referring to authoritarianism tendencies, “Above all in efforts to control other parts of the state.”
The confluence of factors leads to a muddled picture when it comes to a potential González administration. On the citizen security front, it seems she would employ both social policies with hard-line tactics. But with the ghost of Correa hovering over the elections, there is also the perception the RC may seek retribution for what they see as politically-motivated prosecutions of their leaders, says Melania Carrión, a political scientist who has consulted with several governments on security matters, including both the Correa and Noboa administrations.
“[She] has paid attention to these social themes, so I would expect a Citizen Revolution government to be open to, in some spaces, tackling social themes,” Carrión told InSight Crime, referring to González. “But I don’t think it’s going to be her central theme. Really, it’s going to be to keep power and seek vengeance on whom they think has persecuted them. And yes, she has an agenda of political persecution, of impunity. There is no doubt there is an agenda of impunity.”
During the elections, Noboa has taken advantage of the perceived ideological ties between Correa, Venezuela, and Nicaragua. The analyst Luis Córdova-Alarcón describes Noboa’s strategy as a set of handrails that he has used to climb popular opinion.
One handrail is the rhetoric connecting Correa with Ortega in Nicaragua and Nicolás Maduro, the authoritarian president of Venezuela, who has been intimately linked with transnational criminal activity.
“It is like an umbilical cord – leftist populism, drug trafficking, transnational crime,” Córdova-Alarcón told InSight Crime. “And this ideological connection is very marketable during the elections.”
The other handrail, he says, is what Córdova-Alarcón calls the traditional “war on drugs” approach – “reform of the penal code to raise sentences, prosecute minors, etc.” This is easy for the electorate to understand, he says, and it has a ready-made ally in the US government.
Still, both candidates appear to have authoritarian tendencies. While many in the electorate worry that González may subvert the separation of powers, Carrión says Noboa ignores measures he once voted for during his previous life as a congressional representative, including one that would give prison authorities more power over how to govern the penitentiary system.
“He’s a demagogue,” Carrión said. “It’s a populist government, demagogic, very improvised, without structure.”
There have also been troubling signs regarding the separation of powers. In December, the Attorney General’s Office announced that it was investigating the presidential appointee of the judicial counsel who threatened a judge. A member of the Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Contencioso Electoral) also denounced the executive branch for trying to compromise its independence.
For his part, Córdova Alarcón referred to Noboa as “the intellectual and political antithesis” of Correa but someone with a similar moral compass.
“The bottom line: They are the same,” he said, alluding to how they will approach the use of executive power to bend the government to their will.
Crime Reduction May Not Depend on the State
In some ways, Noboa’s militarization of the prisons and the streets has worked. Homicides for 2024 were down by at least 15% from 2023. Killings in prisons were also down from previous years.
But in other ways, the strategy has helped usher in the next phase of the conflict. On November 12, a small criminal group known as the Duendes (Dwarfs) ambushed another small criminal group known as the Freddy Kruegers inside the Litoral Prison. At least 17 were killed.
Litoral is the country’s largest, most dangerous prison, and it was long divided among Ecuador’s most prominent criminal groups whose battles centered on controlling the international drug trade. But the November dispute, according to authorities, was over the formal and informal distribution of food, one of many illegal prison-based economies that make them so contentious.
The massacre illustrated another problem as well: That the gangs were atomizing at a rapid rate, making an already difficult situation worse. Alliances between the gangs have also unraveled, says Rivera-Rhon, including ones between the Choneros, Tiguerones, and the Chone Killers. The result, he says, is the government is more of a bystander than a protagonist in citizen security.
“Every day, we feel that the reduction or rise in violence depends less on state policies and more on pacts between criminal organizations,” he said, referring to him and his team at the observatory.
This is evident in the most recent homicide statistics. According to Ecuavisa, homicides reached at least 731 in January, a 45% increase from January 2024. The report showed particularly stark jumps in the provinces of El Oro and Manabí.
El Oro, as its name suggests, is one of the epicenters of illegal gold mining, which is also being fiercely contested by remnants of larger criminal organizations, such as the Lobos. The fighting between the splintering factions has left dozens dead. Most recently, the mayor of the municipality of Arenillas was gunned down on January 11, after he and his son participated in a cycling event, the second mayor killed in that province in the past nine months.
The spiraling violence over yet another criminal economy is a reminder that whoever wins the presidency will face a challenging criminal environment, over which even the most punitive president may have only limited impact.
*Gavin Voss and Lynn Pies contributed to the reporting for this story.