The Tren de Aragua brand is far stronger than the organization behind it, fed in no small part by discourse coming out of the United States. But what is the future of the gang and Venezuelan transnational organized crime?
Smart Venezuelan criminals are now shunning any Tren de Aragua branding. US recognition of the group as a foreign terrorist organization opens up a more comprehensive law enforcement toolbox, not one that any criminal structure looking at long-term survival wants to confront. Awareness of the group throughout Latin America has pushed it to the top of law enforcement priorities in many countries. The group’s core leadership and cohesion has been battered with the loss of its home base of Tocorón prison in Aragua and the capture of leaders in Colombia, Peru, and Chile. All of this suggests that Tren De Aragua is in decline. Is it an irreversible decline? What factors could shape the future of Tren de Aragua?
*This article is the ninth in a nine-part investigation, “Tren de Aragua: Fact vs. Fiction,” analyzing the truth about the gang, as well as its evolution, current operations and how it may change in the future. Read the full investigation here.
1. How Well Tren de Aragua Weathers Security Force Offensives
There is a belief now, with the crushing of the once mighty Mara street gangs in El Salvador, that criminal groups can be quickly defeated. It is however worth considering that El Salvador is a very small nation, comparable in size to the US state of Massachusetts, and the Maras, while a shadow of their former selves in El Salvador, are still thriving in neighboring Guatemala and Honduras.
There are plenty of criminal syndicates that have survived decades of both national and international security force pressure in Latin America, like Colombia’s National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN), founded in 1964; Brazil’s Red Command (Comando Vermelho – CV), founded in the early 1970s; and Mexico’s Sinaloa Cartel, with roots going back to the 1970s. It is worth noting however that these groups operate in their home nations for the most part, unlike Tren de Aragua, which has many of its affiliates established in foreign countries, making them more vulnerable.
Their survival depends in part on how well the Venezuelan gangs abroad consolidate their presence, diversify their revenue streams, and integrate into the local criminal landscape, recruiting locals and penetrating the local political and law enforcement worlds.
The survival of Tren de Aragua as an organization, not just a franchise name, depends on how the different affiliated gangs support each other. Mutual support and reinforcement could multiply their strength and resilience. On the flip side, how different security forces and law enforcement agencies in the Americas work together could greatly increase the effectiveness of national efforts to dismantle the Venezuelan gang, through sharing intelligence and conducting joint operations.
2. Continuing Migration Flows From Venezuela and Tren de Aragua’s Ability to Exploit Them
Tren de Aragua went transnational off the backs of Venezuelan migrants, exploiting them as they traveled across Latin America, and continuing to profit off them once they settled. Future migration flows may well have an outsize impact on its evolution. In January this year, President Nicolás Maduro installed himself for another six years of rule, having stolen the 2024 election. A survey carried out in August last year found that more than 40% of Venezuelans expressed a wish to leave the country.
While Colombia, Peru, the United States, and Chile have some of the biggest Venezuelan diasporas, and therefore families and friends to help new migrants establish themselves, the first two nations are suffering from a saturation of labor markets, compounded in Colombia with a spluttering economy. Under President Donald Trump, the United States has become a hostile environment for migrants, while rising xenophobia in Chile is also discouraging Venezuelans. Therefore, migration will likely switch to different places.
Possible destinations include Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and some of the more prosperous Caribbean nations. Tren de Aragua is well placed for Brazil and the Caribbean nations of Guyana and Suriname, with its last sanctuary in Venezuela, that of Las Claritas in Bolívar state, sitting close to the borders of both Brazil and Guyana. Sources have also revealed how the Tren de Aragua founder who runs the criminal fiefdom of Las Claritas, Yohan Jose Romero, alias “Johan Petrica,” is a regular visitor to the northern Brazilian state of Roraima, which now has a significant Venezuelan diaspora, with Spanish being widely spoken alongside the native Portuguese.
There is little evidence of Tren de Aragua presence in any of the Southern Cone nations, traditionally safer countries than their northern neighbors, and therefore perhaps vulnerable to criminal penetration as Chile found itself.
3. Position Adopted by the Maduro Regime
The takeover of Tocorón prison signaled the definitive shift in Tren de Aragua’s position with respect to the Maduro regime from a protected or at least tolerated criminal outfit, to a formal enemy of the state. However, it is clear that the faction of Johan Petrica still enjoys local protection from military and political authorities in Bolívar state.
The Maduro regime could go either way now. It could either conduct a Tocorón-style operation in Las Claritas, Bolívar, and destroy the last remaining sanctuary of Tren de Aragua in Venezuela, or it could decide that the gang is an asset, and leave it unmolested in Venezuela, while using elements abroad to further its geopolitical and economic goals.
The Maduro regime is facing several different challenges. The first is international, with Venezuela facing isolation over the stolen presidential elections last year. But with respect to the United States, the tone changed in August, with the offer of $50 million reward for information leading to the capture and/or conviction of Nicolás Maduro. This, combined with a statement by Secretary of State Marco Rubio, suggest that Washington is going to pursue a much more aggressive policy against Venezuela, while still allowing US companies, like Chevron to operate.
“Maduro is the leader of the designated narco-terrorist organization Cartel de Los Soles, and he is responsible for trafficking drugs into the United States and Europe,” Rubio said.
The second huge Maduro challenge is economic. Without enough income to maintain public services and fund local government, Maduro has become reliant on criminal economies to keep senior regime figures loyal. Smuggling, gold and cocaine are the main earners. And Venezuela’s involvement in the cocaine trade is deepening with the sowing of industrial-sized coca plantations to produce cocaine in-country. Venezuela is no longer simply a transit nation for cocaine, but a producer.
If Tren de Aragua, which already has drug retail operations in Colombia, Peru and Chile, were to become an asset and partner for the Cartel of the Suns, that is state-embedded drug trafficking organizations within the Maduro regime, then the gang might regain some political protection and therefore impunity.
4. Ability of Tren de Aragua to Establish Itself in Prisons Around Latin America
If there is one thing Tren de Aragua understands well, it is how to run a prison. Born as a “pranato,” or prison gang in Tocorón jail, the Venezuelan criminals understand how to manage a prison, and turn one into a base for criminal operations with influence far beyond the walls. InSight Crime has found evidence of Venezuelan criminals gaining influence, and even certain levels of control, in prisons in Colombia (especially in the border city of Cúcuta), Peru, and Chile.
If prison authorities are corrupted or unable to effectively maintain governance inside a penitentiary with a significant Venezuelan population, then there are risks of Tren de Aragua or affiliated criminals setting up criminal infrastructure and being able to project themselves beyond prison walls.
5. Involvement in the Transnational Drug Trade, Especially Cocaine
Most Latin American criminal organizations have gone transnational off the back of the drug trade, especially cocaine. Tren de Aragua has been an exception to this pattern. While it has local drug sales or microtrafficking as part of its criminal portfolio, there have not yet been any examples of the gang getting involved in large scale drug trafficking across borders. Yet with cells spread across Latin America, it would not be a leap for the different affiliated gangs to work together in the interests of the drug trade. The fact this has not happened is perhaps an indication of the poor levels of cooperation between different Tren de Aragua factions.
SEE ALSO: Venezuela’s Cocaine Revolution
If Tren de Aragua, working with other Venezuelan gangs and the Cartel of the Suns, were to make a leap into the wholesale cocaine trade, this could be a game changer for the gang, and ensure it a seat at the criminal top table. Any organization that has successfully got involved in the cocaine trade tends to make very fast gains in wealth, power and sophistication.
What is clear from the rhetoric of officials, especially in the United States, is that Tren de Aragua is now being used as a general description for all Venezuelan criminals captured abroad, whether or not they have proven links to the original prison gang. This is the same situation with the use of the term “Cartel of the Suns,” which is not a vertically integrated criminal organization headed by Maduro, but rather a series of often unconnected drug trafficking organizations that operate within different institutions of the Venezuelan state.
Thus, from a public perception across the region, Tren de Aragua is going to remain a feature of news reports and official discourse. But once the remaining two Tren de Aragua founders, Hector Rusthenford Guerrero Flores, alias “Niño Guerrero,” and Johan Petrica, are caught or killed, then the prison gang that once ruled Tocorón jail will be gone. All that will live on will be the brand and the reputation for extreme violence.