As part of a series of security reforms pushed by Mexico’s government, the country’s main civilian public security force has been placed under military command, extending the long-standing trend of militarization in the fight against crime.
On July 1, reforms to the National Guard Law (Ley de la Guardia Nacional) took effect, transferring the force from the Security and Citizen Protection Ministry (Secretaría de Seguridad y Protección Ciudadana – SSPC) to the Defense Ministry (Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional – SEDENA), where the army and air force already operate. The move means Mexico now lacks a nationwide civilian police force and has four military institutions, including the navy.
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The National Guard was created in 2019 during President Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s administration to replace the Federal Police (Policía Federal) and serve as the front line against soaring levels of criminal violence. Although it was conceived as a civilian body, it incorporated both former federal police officers and army and navy battalions and has been led by commanders with military backgrounds.
This design clashed with López Obrador’s initial promise to move away from military-led security policies. In practice, the National Guard reproduced a military logic in its approach to fighting crime, leading to repeated cases of excessive use of force and heavy criticism from civil society.
The Guard’s formal integration into the armed forces has raised new concerns about how it will affect coordination among Mexico’s various security institutions. While the Guard will still be tasked with implementing civilian security policies, it must now answer to a military hierarchy. Moreover, the armed forces have historically operated with limited civilian oversight and a high degree of opacity in the management of their resources and operations.
InSight Crime spoke with Daira Arana, executive director of the thinktank Global Thought and an expert on civil-military relations, to analyze the implications of the reform for Mexico’s public security.
InSight Crime (IC): The National Guard has always had a strong military component, despite being a civilian force. In practice, what changes now that it formally comes under SEDENA’s control?
Daira Arana (DA): First, this is an administrative and formal change in which the National Guard ceases to be part of public security institutions and becomes another permanent armed force alongside the army, air force, and navy.
Operationally, though, not much will change. From the beginning, the Guard had a strong military backbone. Much of its training, doctrine, and organization were designed within the state’s military framework.
What will change is that, since the Guard continues to perform public security functions, the armed forces will now be required to comply with standardized police reporting and first responder protocols.
IC: How does the National Guard fit within the broader structure of Mexico’s armed forces? Do its functions complement or overlap with the others?
DA: I wouldn’t say they complement each other — they definitely overlap.
The National Guard is authorized to support the army and air force in national defense tasks, and the army and air force are authorized to support the Guard in public security operations. So there’s a blending of roles and missions that blurs the line between defense and policing.
There’s also a dimension within SEDENA where the National Guard is seen as something of an internal rival to the army and air force, partly because of the incentives and benefits offered to recruit between 130,000 and 140,000 people into the Guard as part of its incorporation into SEDENA.
That has created some internal tension between the three forces, since army and air force personnel feel sidelined compared to the perks being offered to Guard members.
IC: Mexico’s security strategy continues to rely heavily on the use of the military to fight organized crime. Why does this approach remain the government’s preference?
DA: On one hand, there’s a public perception of trust in the armed forces when it comes to combating crime, and that’s been documented in several studies.
At the same time, the armed forces have an interest in remaining involved in these tasks. This has to do with having more budget, which I think is what motivated the transfer of the National Guard to SEDENA. Although SEDENA provided its own personnel when the Guard was created, having it housed under the SSPC meant those positions would be paid from the SSPC’s budget.
Now, SEDENA keeps both the positions and the budget. The Federal Expenditure Budget (Presupuesto de Egresos de la Federación) for this year shows that SEDENA continues to receive significant increases in funding. So yes, the armed forces have clear institutional incentives to stay involved in public security, even when their leaders publicly claim otherwise.
Civilian authorities also benefit from letting the armed forces take charge of fighting organized crime, particularly in tasks that create a short-term perception of efficiency. In some contexts, they’ve managed to contain violence related to organized crime, at least temporarily. But over the long term, this approach has not proven beneficial.
IC: Should we expect continuity in Mexico’s security strategy, or does this reform represent a significant shift?
DA: The legislative changes introduced so far under President Claudia Sheinbaum mark a return to the security approach of former President Felipe Calderón (2006–2012), which was criticized for years.
On one hand, Calderón emphasized intelligence and limited military participation while strengthening civilian institutions. But his strategy was also combat-oriented, with clear military undertones.
So yes, we’re likely to see a significant shift compared to the previous López Obrador administration, which failed to articulate a coherent security strategy that delivered real results beyond manipulating homicide and crime data.
But in the medium and long term, if Sheinbaum’s government doesn’t complement its strategy with broader public policies aimed at reducing crime and violence, the results will fall short.
IC: The National Guard has been accused of human rights violations and excessive use of force since its creation. How could this situation evolve under the new framework?
DA: The reform does not provide additional safeguards for citizens to prevent serious human rights violations related to excessive use of force, torture, or extrajudicial executions. The recent legal changes do not address the Guard’s underlying doctrine, training, or equipment, only its legal status and general disciplinary system.
I don’t think the new law will necessarily lead to a sharp rise in human rights abuses. But we will likely see the same patterns of force use continue.
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Various studies show that, overall, the public does not see human rights violations by the military as particularly significant when they occur during security operations. What will be interesting to watch is how corruption evolves. Corruption is something the public does care about, and it erodes trust in both civilian and military institutions.
We’re also in a period where transparency and accountability are extremely limited. So, beyond the cases that make it into the media, it will be increasingly difficult to track the use of force by security institutions.
This interview has been edited for clarity and length.
Featured image: A member of the Mexican National Guard on duty just outside Mexico City, March 18, 2025. Credit: AP