In the early morning of September 23, 2023, convoys of up to 11,000 heavily armed security officers, some in armored vehicles, arrived in the state of Aragua, north-central Venezuela, with the mission of retaking control of the Aragua Penitentiary Center. The prison, popularly known as Tocorón, was the most notorious in the country and the main sanctuary and center of operations of Tren de Aragua.
The officers entered the prison and commando groups of the Scientific, Criminal, and Criminalistic Investigations Corps (Cuerpo de Investigaciones Científicas, Penales y Criminalísticas – CICPC) attached plastic explosives to the bars of the cells where they could not gain access inside the prison.
*This article is the second in a nine-part investigation, “Tren de Aragua: Fact vs. Fiction,” analyzing the truth about the gang, as well as its evolution, current operations, and how it may change in the future. Read the full investigation here.
The unprecedented security force deployment was unnecessary. The criminals who had nested within Tocorón’s walls offered no resistance. Mainly because the Tren de Aragua leadership was long gone. By late afternoon, the inmates had been transferred to other prisons without incident.
The events were a stark contrast to a previous prison intervention. Over a decade earlier, in 2011, 5,000 officers were deployed to retake the Rodeo prison complex, then the most violent in Venezuela, located on the outskirts of Caracas and controlled by criminal gangs. Only after a dozen deaths and intense negotiations that stretched over a month did the government manage to regain control.
In the wake of the Tocorón raid, none of Tren de Aragua’s key members, particularly its top leader, Héctor Rusthenford Guerrero Flores, alias “Niño Guerrero,” were found in the cells. The gang leadership had already left the prison, having been warned of the impending operation. Sources within the prison told InSight Crime that Niño Guerrero had imposed a curfew for three days before the military takeover, and that during that time, weapons, money, and people had left the prison via a tunnel.
The day after the prison takeover, then-Interior and Justice Minister Remigio Ceballos stood outside its gates and announced the end of the group operating there. “All those structures that called themselves ‘pranato’ have been totally dismantled. They even existed with a name, as they called the Tren de Aragua, they do not exist. The Tren de Aragua does not exist.”
The prison takeover was a major blow against Tren de Aragua, which now had affiliates in Colombia, Peru, and Chile. The beating heart of Tren de Aragua was gone.
The violence that accompanied Tren de Aragua’s expansion across Latin America had generated panic across the region. The reason for the Tocorón operation was likely because the Venezuelan gang had become a source of embarrassment for the Maduro regime which had to respond to international complaints.
“There was external pressure from Colombia. It was not the same if the claim came from the government of [former Colombian President] Iván Duque than if it came from [Colombian President] Gustavo Petro and [Chilean President] Gabriel Boric. I think there was significant pressure there,” Javier Mayorca, a consultant on Venezuelan security issues, told InSight Crime.
Tren de Aragua, before the takeover of Tocorón, had been a paradigmatic example of hybrid governance, where the Venezuelan government sought allies with criminal groups to maintain control in areas where it was weak – in this case, the prisons. The pranato system saw the state cede control of prisons to the prison gang bosses, the pranes, to maintain order and prevent a repeat of the Rodeo prison fiasco.
But the growing fame of Tren de Aragua around the Americas had become a source of international discomfort for the regime of President Nicolás Maduro. Plus, presidential elections were coming up, and little plays better than spectacular security force operations.
Sacrificing Tocorón served as the perfect excuse for the government to exile the parts of Tren de Aragua that were no longer useful for its purposes, and satiate international calls for action against the gang. With international pressure eased, Maduro could concentrate on his presidential bid.
The End of the Tocorón Era
The invasion of Tocorón was a major blow to Tren de Aragua. The gang had turned the prison into its logistical hub — a secure base from which it could coordinate members and their movements around the world. For them, Tocorón was their safe zone. They called it Casa Grande, the “big home.”
The first loss was to the gang’s revenues. The prison was a money-maker in itself. The inmates had to pay regular extortion fees, known as the “causa,” which was a major source of income for the organization. Tren de Aragua’s estimated income from the collection of the causa alone was approximately $2.8 million per year. Prisoners could also pay extra for privileges, such as better accommodations or permits to leave the prison.
The fall of Tocorón ended the gang’s monopoly over multiple criminal economies in Aragua. From inside the prison, members orchestrated kidnappings, extortion, and vehicle theft. In many cases, victims’ families had to go to the prison to pay a ransom. Those whose vehicles were stolen could negotiate their recovery at Tocorón — for a fee.
Inmates also carried out cybercrimes and scams through WhatsApp and Facebook, and profited from drug trafficking both inside the prison and in Aragua’s neighborhoods.
The prison was also a recruitment and training center. Most of Tren de Aragua’s recruits came from the jail population, carefully selected by the gang. At least three former Tren de Aragua members interviewed by InSight Crime said the group sought specific profiles, from people with IT skills to experts in administration and accounting. Police sources interviewed on condition of anonymity added that the gang even preselected inmates for the judicial authorities to send to their prison.
In this way, the group built a line of lieutenants — or luceros, as mid-level leaders are known — trained inside Tocorón, ready to follow orders from the top leadership, and later capable of leading the organization’s expansion.
The prison also served as a refuge for some of Venezuela’s most powerful and dangerous criminals. José Ángel Santana, alias “El Santanita,” one of the gang’s lieutenants and a former leader of a criminal group in Lara state, sheltered in Tocorón when authorities pursued him for a series of kidnappings and extortion cases, according to multiple sources in both states. He felt safer in the prison, anonymous and protected by the pranato, than out on the streets. Carlos Luis Revette, alias “El Koki,” leader of the gang that controlled the Cota 905 neighborhood — one of Caracas’ most notorious barrios — is also believed to have spent time in the prison after being displaced from his territory during a massive security operation in the capital.
Nearly two years after the intervention, it is clear the gang has lost control of much of the territory it dominated within Venezuela. Several leaders of Tren de Aragua’s satellite gangs fled the state alongside Tocorón inmates, and although they promised via WhatsApp to return, their prolonged absence has weakened local structures. Since then, some of their commanders have been killed in clashes during continued local security operations.
Still, in neighborhoods like San Vicente — where the gang established its extramural operations hub around 2015 and imposed strict social control — its presence remains. Remnants of the gang led by Kenferson Sevilla Arteaga, alias “El Flipper,” have maintained influence through ties with local organizations, according to testimonies gathered by InSight Crime. Authorities suspect the gang is behind the June 2025 killing of social media personality Gabriel Sarmiento, who had denounced Tren de Aragua activities online, in Maracay, Aragua’s capital.
SEE ALSO: Tren de Aragua Factions Persist Despite Venezuela’s Crackdown
Nationally, Tren de Aragua’s retreat has been evident. While the group remains active across the border in the Colombian department of Norte de Santander, on the Venezuelan side in Táchira state, its attempt to establish a stronghold failed as it could not compete with the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN), a Colombian rebel group, which controls the area. In Lara and Carabobo states, Tren de Aragua’s operations were limited by the manhunt for local leader El Santanita. And on Sucre’s coast, home to one of its most strategic cells, the gang appears to have been dismantled following the March 2024 arrest in La Guajira, Colombia, of its leader Carlos Antonio López Centeno, alias “El Pilo,” while attempting to traffic 3 tons of marijuana.
The Loss of State Patronage
Much of Tren de Aragua’s initial expansion within Venezuela was due to state ties and patronage. However, with the Tocorón takeover, the Maduro regime had announced that those days were over.
The Torocón takeover, dubbed “Operation Cacique Guaicaipuro” led to the arrest of senior prison officials, accused of informing the leaders of the Tren de Aragua of the operation. Several guards were also imprisoned for their collaboration with Niño Guerrero. Another 50 officers of the Bolivarian National Guard (Guardia Nacional Bolivariana – GNB) were investigated for their alleged involvement with the gang.
These officers were only the lowest link in the system of state collaboration with Tren de Aragua. They were under the authority of the Penitentiary Ministry, which handed over the management of the prisons to the criminal leaders in the first place. The first prison minister, Iris Varela, who set up the state relationship with the pranes, left the post in 2017 and moved to the National Assembly, where she has since lost much of her influence. Today, little remains of her administration after changes were implemented by the military that subsequently took control of the prison system.
One early actor who contributed to the growth of Tren de Aragua was Tareck El Aissami, who was governor of Aragua between 2012 and 2016. He promoted its growth as part of his climb to the peaks of political power. He eventually became vice president and later served in important economic posts, until his downfall in 2023, when the Venezuelan Attorney General’s Office announced an investigation into corruption, which resulted in his 2024 arrest, just months before the Tocorón takeover.
But Tren de Aragua had begun to lose its political cover even before the fall of El Aissami. Local figures relevant to the impunity of its operations had been removed in previous scandals. One of them, the former mayor of Aragua’s Santos Michelena municipality, Pedro Hernández, was arrested in March 2023 for his links to a Tren de Aragua affiliate known as El Conejo’s gang in Las Tejerías, Aragua.
The taking of Tocorón marked a definitive switch for Tren de Aragua from a state-sponsored criminal group to an enemy of the state. This has greatly weakened the gang in Venezuela.Where did Niño Guerrero, the money, and the weapons from Tocorón end up? The Tocorón pran decided to link up with this old friend and fellow Tren de Aragua founder, Yohan Jose Romero, alias “Johan Petrica.” It is likely he left Tocorón, with his close circle, weapons and money, and headed down to Bolívar state, to the town of Las Claritas to find sanctuary and regroup.