The combination of former Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro’s exit from power and increasing US military pressure has disrupted the criminal ecosystem in Venezuela, putting strain on Colombian guerrilla groups that have long benefitted from their ties to Chavismo and which now may retreat into Colombia.
Among the non-state armed organizations that participate in drug trafficking in Venezuela is the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN). The Marxist-Leninist guerrilla group from Colombia has expanded into Venezuelan territory in collusion with local military and political figures. In addition to the ELN are dissident factions of the now-defunct Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC), which have inherited some of the businesses once controlled by their FARC predecessors.
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Although interim President Delcy Rodríguez has yet to comment on the presence of guerrillas in Venezuela or potential military action against them, the US government has demanded concrete results from her government in fighting the criminal groups controlling the country’s drug trade.
The guerrillas’ decision to remain or leave depends largely on whether the Venezuelan government yields to US demands or instead strengthens or at least adheres to its ties with these groups, which have been key to keeping the Chavista regime in power.
A State Offensive in Venezuela?
With Rodríguez as president, the US expects the new government to become an ally in the fight against drug trafficking. However, the regime’s financial and operational ties with Colombian guerrillas threaten to undermine these expectations.
For Washington, the ELN is more than just a rebel group. It is a key drug trafficking actor in the region and has been considered a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) since 1997. Multiple reports from US Congress, the State Department, and US legal proceedings have documented the active participation of ELN members in drug trafficking. In October 2025, the US Secretary of Defense linked the ELN to a boat reportedly carrying cocaine in the Caribbean that was destroyed in a US airstrike, resulting in three fatalities.
SEE ALSO: Cocaine Corridor: Drugs Drive ELN’s Venezuela Expansion
Beyond drug trafficking, the ELN could also pose a risk to US oil interests in Venezuela. After Maduro’s capture, President Donald Trump made it clear that he wants the US to take an active role in Venezuela’s oil industry, and has supported the idea of major oil companies investing at least $100 billion to revitalize and rebuild Venezuela’s deteriorating energy infrastructure.
But the ELN could jeopardize Trump’s business plans for Venezuela. The group has a history of targeting oil infrastructure in Colombia as both a source of financing and a tool to impose political pressure on the Colombian government and associated companies. If foreign companies begin operations in areas with ELN presence, such as the Lake Maracaibo region and the Orinoco Oil Belt, the group could apply the same approach there.
Academics and researchers consulted by InSight Crime agree that, despite pressure from the US government, openly confronting the ELN would be incredibly disruptive for the Venezuelan regime. For years, the relationship between the guerrilla group and sectors of the Venezuelan state has been symbiotic, which means that any change to one also affects the other.
“That the military or the National Guard confront a criminal organization with which they maintain certain economic relationships seems unlikely, at least in the short term,” said Elizabeth Dickinson, a consultant and researcher at the International Crisis Group.
Since mid-August, InSight Crime has reported at least four operations by the Bolivarian National Armed Force (Fuerza Armada Nacional Bolivariana – FANB) targeting ELN structures in border states like Zulia and Amazonas. Though the operations seized pamphlets, uniforms, and old weapons, they had minimal impact on the ELN’s operations, and no one was arrested. Rather than having a real effect on the guerrillas, these operations have served more as a propaganda tool in the Venezuelan government’s anti-crime efforts.
And the Venezuelan security force’s track record against guerrilla groups raises doubts about whether these actions would be very effective. Between 2020 and 2021, during clashes in Apure against the FARC’s 10th Front dissidents, the Venezuelan army suffered significant defeats. Attacking the ELN, which is more deeply embedded with the Venezuelan government, is a much greater risk and could drag Venezuela into an internal armed conflict akin to Colombia’s.
Withdrawal of Troops and Commanders
As Venezuela’s new leaders consider military and political options, media, intelligence reports, and sources consulted by InSight Crime confirmed the movement of ELN troops and commanders from Venezuela toward the border region, which could lead to their amassing even greater control there.
After the US military operation leading to Maduro’s arrest and extraction on January 3, Colombian intelligence reports cited in the press indicated that several ELN and FARC dissident commanders present in Venezuela began to retreat to Colombian territory in what appeared to be a precautionary response to the new political landscape.
This information was partially confirmed by Fritz Sánchez, a Venezuelan journalist covering the Amazon region, who stated on his X account that FARC dissidents withdrew from the Cedeño municipality in Bolívar state.
In conversation with InSight Crime, Sánchez explained, “The dissidents withdrew following Maduro’s extraction, while the ELN remains, but more discreetly. They have either retreated or kept a lower profile, waiting to see how the political landscape evolves in the country.”
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Academics, journalists, and researchers say that this retreat did not begin after Maduro’s arrest but had been brewing for weeks.
Between December 14 and 17, the ELN declared an “armed strike” in protest of what it called US military interference in Latin America and the Caribbean. During this period, communities in guerrilla-controlled territories faced mobility restrictions and threats against any interaction with other armed actors. According to researchers and analysts, the armed strike also served as cover for a reshuffling of leaders and fighters at the Colombia-Venezuela border.
Meanwhile, since December 2025, the ELN has sent senior commanders with military experience to strategic areas in Catatumbo to secure territorial control and anticipate potential conflicts with other armed actors.
“In recent months, it has become more urgent and a priority for the ELN to consolidate its control over the border and reduce the risk of other actors occupying strategic positions that could jeopardize its territorial dominance and criminal economies,” Dickinson explained to InSight Crime.
For years, the Colombia-Venezuela border has been the ELN’s primary strategic bastion, crucial to its financing, political-military project, and survival. Recently, this same area has become a point of interest for the United States, which could lead to increased pressure on the guerrilla group and challenges to its control of the area.
On January 7, the Presidents of Colombia and the United States spoke on the phone and reached a verbal agreement on security and drug trafficking cooperation, with a particular focus on a joint offensive against ELN operations along the Colombia-Venezuela border. The agreement was confirmed by Colombian Defense Minister Pedro Sánchez during a press conference in Washington.
On January 13, Colombian President Gustavo Petro issued a warning to the ELN via a post on X about the consequences it would face if it does not relinquish control over illicit drug and illegal mining revenues originating from Venezuela.
“If the ELN does not join the peace process and leave Venezuela, there will be joint military actions with Venezuela,” Petro stated in his message.
Meanwhile, the ELN has not halted its military offensive against the FARC dissident 33rd Front in Catatumbo, a key border region that has become a battleground for control of one of the region’s most important drug trafficking enclaves since early 2025.
The guerrilla group’s return to its homeland does not guarantee peace. Across the border, they will face more criminal enemies, an adverse government, and the absence of a state complicit in their illegal activities.