The commander-in-chief of the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN), Eliécer Erlinto Chamorro, alias “Antonio García,” appeared incensed after Colombian President Gustavo Petro alluded to the guerrilla group’s involvement in drug trafficking.
“The ELN has never been linked to drug trafficking. In the future, all these lies will fall apart. That time will come,” Antonio García declared in an official communique fired off on September 1.
*This article is the second in a five-part investigation, “Peace Never Had a Chance: Colombia’s ELN in Venezuela,” analyzing the growth of the ELN in Venezuela and how this has allowed the rebel group to project itself into Colombia. Read the full investigation here.
Founded in the 1960s as Marxist Leninist group with roots in Liberation Theology, the ELN leadership has always sought to avoid drug trafficking as an ideological aberration. Yet the ELN’s stance began to weaken in recent decades as the lure of easy money to fuel the revolution won over ideological purity. Certain rebel units or fronts began to impose a tax, known as gramaje, on Colombian coca farmers who worked in the territories it controlled. But the ELN continues to insist it is not directly involved in buying, processing, or transporting cocaine and that it only earns a relatively small amount of money from gramaje.
“We charge a small tax that helps us solve issues with food and clothing,” alias “Ricardo,” commander of the ELN’s Northeastern War Front, told The Times in July.
The forceful and consistent denials belie the reality that drug trafficking has become an essential revenue stream for the ELN. Its profits underpin the existence of several of its fronts, particularly those along the Colombia-Venezuela border. And with military pressure increasing on the Colombian side, the group appears to be moving operations eastward into Venezuela, where it enjoys a collaborative relationship with the authorities.
The ELN has now reportedly expanded to operating its own cocaine laboratories and overseeing the transport of the drug across borders. The group’s seizure of Colombia’s coca-rich Catatumbo border region in early 2025 was a big step in a wider, planned expansion into the drug trade, likely in tandem with elements of President Nicolás Maduro’s regime.
Vertical Integration
Controlling the Colombia-Venezuela border region is central to maximizing the profits of the drug trade because it allows the ELN to control every step of the process, from production to wholesale. It also allows the ELN to project itself deep into Colombia from Venezuela, beyond the reach of the Colombian security forces and their US allies.
The border region has a heavy concentration of coca cultivations, cocaine processing laboratories, and trafficking routes that feed international consumer markets.
The ELN’s takeover in January of Colombia’s Catatumbo region gave it sway over one of the world’s most productive coca-growing areas. Across the border in the Venezuelan state of Zulia, coca cultivation remains in a nascent stage, but sources told InSight Crime that the ELN recruits farmers in Venezuela to harvest coca on both sides of the border.
SEE ALSO: Venezuela and the ELN’s Love-Hate Relationship with Drug Trafficking
The regulation of this market and the control of border corridors is managed by the ELN’s Structure of Finances and Economies for the Revolution (Estructura de Finanzas y Economías para la Revolución – EFER), according to Colombian President Gustavo Petro. This specialized division functions as the financial arm of the Northeastern War Front in Catatumbo, tasked with coordinating drug trafficking operations on both sides of the border. Its duties allegedly include everything from setting up cocaine labs to channeling illicit funds, all regulated by a set of specific rules.
As Colombian authorities increase military pressure against the ELN, the group’s presence in Venezuela has allowed it to relocate drug production beyond reach, across the border.
Continued raids against ELN drug processing laboratories in Colombia have pushed the guerrillas to set up facilities in remote areas of Venezuela, such as the border town of Jesús María Semprún, where they act as de facto authorities.
Cocaine produced on the Colombian side passes easily through ELN controlled territory into Venezuela. Then, along with cocaine produced in-country, it is sent to consumer markets. Drugs typically transit Zulia via Lake Maracaibo, which empties into the Caribbean Sea. Shipments also depart from the coasts of the neighboring state of Falcón. The loads often head to the islands of Aruba, Bonaire, and Curaçao before being shipped to Europe. Others are sent further eastward to be dispatched from the coastal states of Carabobo and La Guaira to nearby Caribbean islands, while others are flown directly from clandestine airstrips in Zulia to Central America.
Alternative routes from Venezuela to the Caribbean include flights sent to islands from the border state of Apure or following the path of the Orinoco River, which runs through the states of Amazonas, Apure, Bolívar, Guárico, and Anzoátegui, along many points controlled by the ELN. It then feeds into the Atlantic Ocean.
Cross-Border Control
Zulia’s northernmost municipality, Guajira, offers an example of the importance of the ELN’s binational presence and social control for its drug trafficking activities – as well as its complicated relationship with Venezuelan authorities.
Traffickers are increasingly turning their focus toward Guajira as security forces along other routes have started to demand higher fees for turning a blind eye to the drug trade. While Machiques de Perijá, the municipality to the north of Jesús María Semprún, was once a popular route for sending drugs to Lake Maracaibo, sending illicit shipments to Guajira, which lies directly on the Caribbean, now appears to be a more economical option.
“It became almost impossible for drug traffickers to transport drugs because it was becoming too expensive,” one agricultural producer in Machiques de Perijá told InSight Crime. “All the authorities wanted their piece.”
A legacy of state neglect and security force abuses in Guajira laid the foundation for the ELN to gain a perception of quasi-legitimacy among segments of the local population. What’s more, Maduro loyalists dominate local politics, meaning they are unlikely to cause any problems for Maduro’s guerrilla ally, and indeed may come to them for help during elections.
Multiple sources told InSight Crime that the ELN uses the city of Maicao in the Colombian department of La Guajira as an operational hub for sending drugs to Venezuela’s Guajira. The Venezuelan town’s sparse population, large porous border with Colombia, and extensive coastline makes it ideal for traffickers sending drugs to islands in the Caribbean or Central America.
The recent discovery of a partly constructed semi-submersible vessel at an artisanal shipyard in Guajira suggests the municipality may have even become the departure point for drugs sent directly to Europe, given that some narco subs are now capable of transatlantic journeys.
A Double-Edged Sword
The drug trade is a key part of the ELN’s relationship with the Maduro regime, which is mutually beneficial, though in some ways the government maintains the upper hand. The ELN pays in services and cash for protection to operate in Venezuelan territory.
The ELN provides multiple benefits to the Venezuelan government. In areas like Guajira, where the state is weak, the ELN maintains order. Additionally, the group has interfered in elections with the aim of bolstering candidates loyal to Maduro’s political party. Its presence along the border also acts as a buffer and early warning against potential invasion from Colombia.
But crucially, the bribes drug traffickers pay security forces indirectly help ensure Maduro remains in power.
The system has become known as the Cartel of the Suns. It is less of a drug trafficking organization and more of a description of the generalized practice of corruption. The government ensures the loyalty of a military it cannot afford to pay a living wage by allowing officials to enrich themselves from bribes from drug traffickers or even direct participation in the business.
SEE ALSO: Beyond the Cartel of the Suns
In this sense, the interests of Maduro and the ELN align. The financially struggling Venezuelan government stands to benefit from its ally controlling the entire drug trafficking chain because it means more illicit profits can be fed into a corrupt state apparatus. A stronger ELN also provides more potential muscle for a Maduro regime plagued by a lack of domestic legitimacy and increasing geopolitical pressures.
The ELN’s ultimate goal is to become the sole, dominant criminal actor along the entire Colombia-Venezuela border. With protection from Venezuela, that goal seems within reach. And it goes beyond the drug trade to include the replication of its grassroots political model developed over the six decades in Colombia, but now being employed in Venezuela.