It was 2016 when Raúl* received a visit that would mark the beginning of a long nightmare. A Venezuelan general came to his ranch and handed him a phone. On the other end of the line was Diosdado Cabello, one of the most powerful figures in Chavismo and today Venezuela’s Minister of Interior, Justice, and Peace.
Cabello was direct. He wanted to buy Raúl’s ranch, a vast cattle farm located on the border with Colombia. Raúl refused. Some time later, a second offer came, this time made in person by Cabello. The answer was the same.
*This article is the fifth in a six-part investigation, “Cocaine and Venezuela’s Cartel of the Suns Post-Maduro,” exploring the current drug trafficking dynamics in Venezuela, the nature of the Cartel of the Suns, and their future without Maduro. Read the full investigation here.
For months, Raúl believed the matter had been put to rest. But in 2017, he was arrested by a unit of the General Directorate of Military Counterintelligence (Dirección General de Contrainteligencia Militar – DGCIM). He was sent to prison, tortured, and eventually, the state took over his property.
“They sent generals to speak with me because they were interested in the airstrip my father had built … They wanted to use it for drug trafficking with the guerrillas,” Raúl later told InSight Crime.
Raúl’s ranch is located in the state of Apure, a border region that is a strategic corridor for drug trafficking. From there, small planes loaded with cocaine take off, heading to Central America and the Caribbean, and it has been home to various Colombian guerrilla groups.
Shortly after Raúl’s arrest, the Colombian guerrilla group, the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN), took over his property to coordinate drug trafficking operations in collaboration with high-ranking Venezuelan military and political figures, as Raúl would later find out.
The seizure of Raúl’s ranch is one of the many tactics the ELN, in cooperation with Venezuelan authorities, has used to consolidate its control along the Colombia-Venezuela border. This binational boundary is crossed by countless drug trafficking corridors, an illegal economy that has financed both high-ranking regime officials and Colombian guerrilla groups like the ELN and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC).
Financing the Revolution
Communist guerrillas of Colombian origin, who for decades declared themselves enemies of the capitalist system, ended up integrated into one of its most profitable economies: drug trafficking.
The boom in cocaine production in Colombia allowed the guerrillas to move from collecting a tax from Colombian drug traffickers in the 1980s to becoming today the main supplier of cocaine to the Cartel of the Suns, a corruption network within the Venezuelan government made up of high-ranking military and political figures, thrust into the international spotlight following the January arrest of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro on US drug trafficking charges.
SEE ALSO: Special Series: Maduro’s Arrest and Its Criminal Aftermath in Venezuela
Hugo Chávez’s rise to power in 1998 marked a turning point in the presence of Colombian guerrillas in Venezuela. His political project and public declarations of support for FARC commanders made it easier for these insurgencies to find, across the border, a refuge and a new hub of operations.
In the early 2000s, the relationship between the Venezuelan regime and the FARC became more structured. Chávez appointed high-ranking military and political officials as liaisons with the guerrillas, institutionalizing a mutually beneficial linkage. Under this arrangement, rebel commanders ensured the continuity of their businesses in Venezuelan territory, while senior officers accessed criminal rents, especially those derived from drug trafficking.
“Chávez asked some members of popular power, members of the National Assembly, and other people close to power to make a coalition with the FARC and to allow them to use Venezuelan territory,” Zair Mundaray, a former Venezuelan prosecutor now in exile, told InSight Crime.
While the FARC’s Eastern Bloc dominated extensive territories with coca cultivation and cocaine processing centers, Venezuela offered the ideal logistical platform for export. The involvement of military and political sectors facilitated the movement of shipments through airports, highways, and seaports, consolidating a binational drug trafficking circuit.
The fruits of that relationship were quick to become visible. By 2004, around 250 tons of cocaine a year were being moved through Venezuela, according to US government estimates.
Among the main military figures accused of participation in this criminal web is retired General of the Bolivarian National Armed Forces (Fuerza Armada Nacional Bolivariana – FANB), Clíver Alcalá Cordones, who, according to US judicial documents, provided official Venezuelan weaponry to the FARC. Another key figure, Hugo “El Pollo” Carvajal, former intelligence chief of Chavismo, allegedly provided protection for cocaine shipments, facilitated the establishment of guerrilla bases in border states like Apure, and arranged legal documentation for guerrilla members. Both Alcalá and Carvajal are currently imprisoned in the United States.
Political and Military Alliances of the FARC in Venezuela
February 2026 | Source: US Department of State and research by InSight Crime
Hugo Armando Carvajal Barrios, alias ‘El Pollo’
Positions held
- Military intelligence chief (2004-2011 / Apr 2013–Jan 2014)
- Venezuelan National Assembly Representative for the state of Monagas (2016-2021)
Protected large cocaine shipments from seizure, coordinated multi-ton drug deliveries, and provided weapons and armed security to FARC operations. He also allegedly supplied members of the FARC with official Venezuelan government identification documents. He is currently in US custody awaiting sentencing.
Henry de Jesús Rangel Silva
Positions held
- Counterintelligence chief (2005-2009)
- Armed forces strategic operations commander (2010-2012)
- Defense Minister (Jan 2012–Oct 2012)
Coordinated directly with the FARC and held personal meetings with senior guerrilla leaders Iván Márquez, Rodrigo Granda, and “Timochenko” to guarantee the group’s security in Venezuela. He is also accused of facilitating official identification documents and weapons for FARC members.
Ramón Emilio Rodríguez Chacín, alias ‘Alejandro’
Positions held
- Minister of Interior and Justice (Jan-May 2002 / Jan-Sep 2008)
- Governor of Guárico (2012-2017)
Served as Hugo Chávez’s personal liaison with the FARC, coordinating high-level contacts under the alias “Alejandro.” He allegedly asked the guerrillas to train Venezuelan soldiers in irregular warfare in case of a US invasion, acted as the Venezuelan government’s main weapons contact for the group, and attempted to facilitate a $250 million state loan to the FARC in 2007. In 2008, the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) placed him on its Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list for materially supporting the FARC.
Freddy Alirio Bernal Rosales
Positions held
- Mayor of Libertador municipality (2000-2008)
- National Assembly representative (2011-2016)
- Head of government food assistance program known as CLAP (2016-present)
- Domestic intelligence chief (2017)
- Protector and Governor of Táchira (2018-present)
Allegedly facilitated arms sales between the Venezuelan government and the FARC, and in June 2002 appeared in an email from guerrilla leader Rodrigo Granda in which requested training for pro-government gangs known as colectivos. In 2011, the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned him for providing material support to the FARC.
Clíver Antonio Alcalá Cordones
Positions held
- Commander of the Fourth Division (Maracay region) (2010-2012)
- Commander of Guayana regional security force (2013)
A major general of the Venezuelan Army’s Fourth Armored Division, he allegedly used his position to establish an arms-for-drugs pipeline with the FARC. In March 2020, he was indicted in US federal court on drug trafficking, weapons, and terrorism charges. He was also sanctioned by the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) in 2011. He is currently in US custody awaiting sentencing.
Amilcar Jesús Figueroa Salazar, alias ‘Tino’
Positions held
- United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) member
Member of Venezuela’s delegation to the Latin American Parliament (Parlamento Latinoamericano) who has served as a primary arms dealer for the FARC, and is a main conduit for FARC leaders based in Venezuela. He has also provided training for the FARC members. He was sanctioned by the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) in 2011.
Ramón Isidro Madriz Moreno, alias ‘Amin’
Positions held
- Domestic intelligence agent
Key officer of Venezuela’s domestic intelligence service (SEBIN) who has coordinated security for the FARC. He was sanctioned by the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) in 2011.
Diosdado Cabello Rondón
Positions held
- Governor of Miranda (2004-2008)
- Secretary-General of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (2011-present)
- National Assembly representative (2011-2024); National Assembly President (2012-2016)
- Constituent National Assembly President (2018-2020)
- Minister of Interior, Justice and Peace (2024-present)
Allegedly gave orders to transport tons of cocaine out of Venezuela via networks involving the FARC, linking these shipments to routes toward the United States and Europe. In May 2018, the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned Cabello, his family, and associates for using their positions to engage in money laundering, corruption, and drug trafficking, including activities tied to designated terrorist groups. A 2020 US federal indictment further alleges that Cabello conspired with the FARC and other criminal organizations as part of the so-called Cartel of the Suns.
In an initial phase, the FARC supplied the drugs and Venezuelan military officers guaranteed transportation, with both operating through seasoned traffickers like Daniel “El Loco” Barrera and Walid Makled, alias “El Turco.” However, the downfall of several of these kingpins disrupted the balance of the business and opened a new chapter in the relationship between the guerrillas and the Venezuelan regime.
The FARC began dispatching shipments via their own infrastructure, primarily clandestine airstrips located in border regions of Venezuela, such as Apure or Zulia. At the same time, the networks of corruption embedded within the Venezuelan state — the Cartel of the Suns — began negotiating directly with buyers and sending out their own consignments.
By around 2013, the death of Chávez and the start of peace negotiations between the FARC and the government of Juan Manuel Santos in Colombia reshaped the landscape. With Nicolás Maduro in the presidency of Venezuela, the regime began weaving new criminal alliances, while the disarmament of the FARC led to the creation of dissident groups that, although they maintained political ties, also generated enmities with the regime.
The Heir to the Business
In 2016, the Colombian government signed a peace agreement with the FARC that resulted in the demobilization and disarmament of about 13,200 fighters. However, not all of the organization’s commanders supported the negotiations. Some leaders chose to stay armed and preserve their illicit businesses, especially along the Colombia–Venezuela border.
With the backdrop of a longstanding presence in Venezuela, the first FARC dissident factions took advantage of the bases already established in that country and the ties built with military personnel under the orders of Maduro.
One of the principal dissident factions that maintained these links is the Acacio Medina Front, led by Géner García Molina, alias “John 40,” whose center of operations is located in the state of Amazonas in southern Venezuela, bordering the Colombian departments of Guainía and Vichada. Since approximately 2013 and up to today, John 40 and his men have managed to consolidate one of the main cocaine and gold corridors in the region, in which the permissiveness and complicity of sectors of the Bolivarian National Guard (Guardia Nacional Bolivariana – GNB) have been crucial to its functioning.
SEE ALSO: The Colombo-Venezuelan Guerrillas: How Colombia’s War Migrated to Venezuela
In August 2019, a group of prominent FARC leaders took up arms again and used Venezuela as a platform to launch their insurgent project. Luciano Marín Arango, alias “Iván Márquez,” and Seuxis Pausías Hernández Solarte, alias “Jesús Santrich,” split from the peace process and founded the self‑designated “Second Marquetalia.” The group established its base in the state of Apure, a key drug trafficking hub on the border with Colombia.
The entry of the Second Marquetalia into the criminal landscape created fractures among FARC dissident factions and sparked a dispute for control of strategic border corridors between Colombia and Venezuela.
Those tensions led to open confrontations. In 2021, the Venezuelan army launched a military offensive against the 10th Front of the FARC dissidents in Apure, a zone critical for drug trafficking and control of border crossings. Politicians, journalists, and residents in the region told InSight Crime that the operation aimed to displace that faction to facilitate territorial control of the Second Marquetalia over strategic narcotrafficking routes.
Over time, Venezuela ceased to be a safe refuge for FARC dissidents. The country became the graveyard for several of its key commanders, such as Hernán Darío Velásquez, alias “El Paisa,” and Henry Castellanos Garzón, alias “Romaña,” along with multiple attacks against Iván Márquez.
“Part of the old FARC remains, but it is no longer one person who controls drug trafficking or the routes. That power today is more fragmented and, in many cases, in the hands of generals who have their own shares of control in different areas,” a former official from a chavista anti‑drug agency, who preferred to remain anonymous for fear of reprisals, told InSight Crime.
The trusted supplier of the business no longer wears camouflage with FARC initials. Today, the one who controls the corridors, logistics, and illegal revenues on the border sports red‑and‑black armbands.
From Poor Cousins to the Main Players
Long consigned to a role as the poor cousins of the FARC, the failure of the dissidents was the golden ticket that catapulted the ELN’s military and economic project in several areas of the 2,200‑kilometer border shared by Venezuela and Colombia.
“The FARC dissidents were not willing to satisfy Maduro’s government, they were not willing to do everything the regime said,” Raúl told InSight Crime. However, the ELN was willing to take on that role.
Beyond ideological affinity, the ELN came to play a paramilitary role in service of Venezuelan state interests on the border. Control of territories, populations, and illegal economies like cocaine trafficking became the entry card for the ELN to become a key defender of the Bolivarian Revolution.
Behind this strategy is Gustavo Aníbal Giraldo, alias “Pablito,” commander of the Eastern War Front (Frente de Guerra Oriental – FGO), the richest and most powerful ELN fighting division. Pablito and his armed structure are the main financiers of the ELN’s struggle in Colombia.
Colombian intelligence reports, published by Cambio magazine, describe how Pablito controls production laboratories for coca base paste and cocaine hydrochloride, storage warehouses, and clandestine airstrips used to ship drugs out of Venezuela. Gerly Sánchez Villamizar, alias “Mono Gerly,” one of Pablito’s principal lieutenants, was captured in Spain in December 2025. He is accused not only of leading drug trafficking activities but also of running a money‑laundering network that allegedly washed more than $240 million in drug profits.
“He is the main launderer of ELN drug trafficking assets. He’s the capo,” Colombian President Gustavo Petro wrote on X in late 2025, referring to Sánchez.
The ELN’s principal role in drug trafficking in Venezuela is to ensure cocaine flows in from Colombia and to protect airstrips and shipments. Once in Venezuela, the cocaine is dispatched from clandestine strips — like the one on Raúl’s ranch — or transported deeper into the country, from where it is sent to international destinations along various routes.
SEE ALSO: Peace Never Had a Chance: Colombia’s ELN in Venezuela
An exchange of communications obtained by Noticias Caracol’s Investigative Unit shows that, in addition to the cocaine flow controlled by the ELN from Colombia, the Venezuelan military allegedly sold weapons to commanders of that group and coordinated joint operations on Venezuelan soil.
Cabello appears as another link between the regime and the ELN, according to the most recent US indictment against Maduro and testimony from former military officers and ranchers who spoke with InSight Crime. Cabello has been responsible for providing the necessary elements so that the ELN — and, more broadly, drug trafficking in Venezuela — can occur without hindrance.
Cabello allegedly traveled between 2022 and 2024 to ELN‑controlled clandestine airstrips on the border with Colombia to ensure that cocaine successfully left Venezuela via covert flights.
“The coordination between the Cartel of the Suns and the guerrilla groups active on the border serves to keep it calm and to allow the merchandise to circulate freely,” a former member of the Venezuelan Communist Party (Partido Comunista Venezolano – PCV), who withheld his name for security reasons, told InSight Crime. “The ELN helps move drugs up to a point, and from there the army guards them.”
The long‑standing relationship between the ELN and key figures in the Chavista regime reduces the likelihood that the shared drug trafficking economies with the Cartel of the Suns will be dismantled, even after Nicolás Maduro’s capture in January 2026. On the contrary, all signs point to an adaptation of these ties, with more covert forms of cooperation between the ELN and sectors of political and military power.
“I see it as unlikely that the Bolivarian regime would decide to fight the ELN,” Luis Fernando Celis, a security analyst specializing in the ELN, told InSight Crime. “I don’t think the ELN is easily targetable in Venezuela, any more than it is in Colombia. The ELN will face challenges, it will have to rebuild its relationships, but I don’t see a major threat to the ELN in the current Venezuelan scenario.”