The National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN) is Colombia’s last active insurgency and the dominant criminal actor along the Colombia-Venezuela border. Given its ample presence on this binational frontier, its different armed factions have launched a process of expansion and consolidation in Venezuela.
SEE ALSO: ELN Criminal Profile
While in Colombia it operates as an insurgent movement opposed to the state, in Venezuela it has consolidated as a paramilitary army serving state interests. This binational character has made the ELN one of Latin America’s principal criminal actors, with its fronts involved in drug trafficking, illegal mining, and extortion.
History
The ELN’s history in Venezuela dates back to shortly after the group’s founding in Colombia in the 1960s. Starting in the 1980s, it used Venezuela as a refuge from Colombian security operations, turning the border state of Apure into its international rearguard.
Early Venezuelan governments were hostile to the ELN’s presence, especially after eight marines were killed in Apure in 1995 in what became known as the Cararabo massacre. In 1998, Venezuela even authorized Colombian forces to pursue guerrillas across the border after an attack.
The arrival of President Hugo Chávez in 1999 marked a shift to friendlier relations with the ELN and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC). Initially Venezuela served as a sanctuary for guerrillas on the run, but it quickly gained strategic and financial importance as the ELN found illicit revenue streams and a tolerant government.
Rising pressure from Colombian security forces, attacks by the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia – AUC), a federation of right-wing paramilitaries created to eradicate the guerrillas, and an uneasy relationship with the FARC pushed the ELN to seek more space in Venezuela.
With the rise of former Venezuela President Nicolás Maduro in 2013, the balance of power tipped in favor of the ELN and their combatants received more favorable treatment. Since then, this has allowed them to expand across Venezuela.
After the FARC signed a peace deal in 2016 and abandoned strategic border areas, the ELN set its sights on controlling the Colombia-Venezuela frontier.This left a power vacuum in several key territories along the border. From that point, the ELN began fighting for these spaces with other criminal actors in an attempt to control the Colombia-Venezuela border.
Taking advantage of their proximity to Freddy Bernal, the governor of Táchira state, as well as the tacit support they received from the Venezuelan military, the ELN managed to expel a Colombian criminal group known as the Rastrojos, which emerged from the country’s paramilitary movement, from Táchira.
The ELN’s dominant presence in states like Táchira allowed them to create a network of clandestine emissaries, control food distribution – especially via food boxes provided by the Venezuelan government’s Local Storage and Production Committees (Comités Locales de Abastecimiento y Producción – CLAP) – and operate as a type of customs authority alongside local political actors and security forces.
Controlling sections of the border also let the group manage contraband and drug smuggling routes, as well as move troops between Colombia and Venezuela, quickly retreating from Colombian operations and staging attacks from Venezuelan soil.
The ELN has also valued its presence in other states, such as Apure, in order for its fighters and leaders to hide out and manage illegal activities like drug trafficking and contraband smuggling.
In 2022, the ELN helped expel the 10th Front of FARC dissidents – which emerged following the 2016 peace deal – from Apure using a strategy of direct confrontation alongside Venezuela’s armed forces. This coordinated pressure where the guerrillas and the state carried out convergent attacks ultimately led to the 10th Front’s expulsion and allowed the ELN to extend its territorial control to areas the dissidents once controlled on the border. In Apure, the ELN maintains strict social control, acting as a de facto powerbroker settling disputes between local citizens and maintaining social order.
In addition to its presence on the border, the ELN has also moved into areas in the center and eastern parts of Venezuela. In the state of Bolívar, specifically within the Orinoco Mining Arc, the ELN has secured access to several gold mining sites. These operations are facilitated by Venezuelan security forces with whom the guerrillas share their illicit profits.
In January 2025, the ELN launched another offensive against the FARC dissidents’ 33rd Front in the Catatumbo region, one of the most strategic drug trafficking corridors in Colombia. Venezuela played a decisive role during the operation, as the ELN used the country as a logistical staging ground to move fighters in and out of the area and to launch coordinated attacks on the other side of the border.
The offensive fortified the ELN’s position in Catatumbo and significantly weakened the 33rd Front’s presence. The dissidents were also hit hard by the so-called “Operation Catatumbo Lightning” in the state of Zulia, which not only impacted the group’s encampments there, but also part of their drug trafficking infrastructure. This combination of military pressure and armed rivalry with the former FARC allowed the ELN to consolidate itself as the main group regulating drug trafficking activity in the region via agreements made with Venezuelan security forces.
A similar pattern emerged in mid-August 2025 at another strategic part of the border between the states of Apure and Amazonas, when the ELN ambushed and killed José Manuel Sierra Sabogal, alias “Zarco Aldinever,” a top commander of a group of former FARC fighters known as the Second Marquetalia that re-took up arms in 2019.
Leadership
The ELN has a confederated structure, with fronts enjoying operational, financial, and military autonomy. Strategic decisions are made by the Central Command (Comando Central – COCE), which brings together the five top commanders and oversees the eight War Fronts active in Colombia and Venezuela.
The group’s current top commander is Eliécer Erlinto Chamorro, alias “Antonio García,” who succeeded Nicolás Rodríguez Bautista, alias “Gabino.”
Another key leader is Israel Ramírez Pineda, alias “Pablo Beltrán,” the group’s number two and chief negotiator in peace talks with the Colombian government.
One of the most influential commanders, Gustavo Aníbal Giraldo, alias “Pablito,” is believed to be in Apure. He is seen as the group’s main liaison with the Venezuelan government and has been wanted by Interpol since 2018 on a “red notice” for multiple crimes.
Other commanders operating from Venezuela include Wilmer Albeiro Galindo, alias “Alex Bonito,” and “Pedro Pablo” or “Copete,” who lead the José Daniel Pérez Carrero Front, a powerful faction controlling mining in Amazonas state.
In addition to diversifying its economic activities, the ELN has significantly increased the number of fights it has in Venezuela. In 2024, intelligence reports estimated that about 1,200 of their 6,000 members were operating inside the country.
Geography
The ELN’s footprint in Venezuela has grown steadily. InSight Crime has verified its presence in at least 8 of Venezuela’s 24 states.
The group’s main strongholds are in Zulia, Táchira, Apure, and Amazonas, where its War Fronts – the Northern, Eastern, and Northeastern Fronts – control border municipalities. These areas give the ELN control over criminal economies and mobility across the border.
Beyond the border zone, the group has expanded into Bolívar, Barinas, Anzoátegui, and Guárico.
Allies and Enemies
The ELN’s most important allies in Venezuela are elements of the state, which allow them to operate with a certain amount of freedom and impunity in the country. In border states, it collaborates with security forces and local authorities, although those relationships are often transactional and unstable.
In 2020, ELN leader “Pablo Beltrán” acknowledged that the group shared common enemies with the Maduro government.
The ELN has also forged ties with the Second Marquetalia. Since 2021, senior leaders from both groups met in Venezuela to coordinate regional criminal expansion, though the relationship soured after the ELN killed José Manuel Sierra Sabogal, alias “Zarco Aldinever,” in a border bombing in 2025.
The group’s fiercest enemies have been other FARC dissident factions, particularly the 10th Front linked to the Central General Staff (Estado Mayor Central – EMC), a conglomerate of different dissident factions that declared war on the ELN in 2022.
Prospects
Despite participating in peace talks in Colombia, it’s not clear what incentive the ELN has to disarm. In Venezuela, the group controls illegal mining, contraband, and drug trafficking with the state’s tolerance, which also affords them a strategic advantage over their criminal enemies in Colombia.
The ELN is also critically important for the regime in Venezuela. The guerrilla group’s discipline and military capabilities during its expansion across Venezuelan territory also demonstrated its potential as a paramilitary force, which may help the regime control strategic territories and populations, as well as regulate certain criminal economies.
The US military operation that led to the capture of Nicolás Maduro in early 2026 and the sustained increase in US military pressure have altered the insulation the ELN once enjoyed in Venezuela. As long as the ELN remains functional to the Delcy Rodríguez administration, the existing agreements will most likely remain in place, albeit with a lower profile.